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Are you happy? This question is asked of people by friends, parents and psychiatrists alike. What
happiness consists of for each person seems, at first glance, to be entirely subjective in that is it up
to each individual person to define what the happy-making ingredients of her life are.
This dissertation centrally involves an interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, often
translated as ‘happiness’. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an inquiry into the chief good for human
beings, and according to Aristotle everyone agrees that this chief good is ‘happiness’, however there
is major disagreement about what ‘happiness’ consists of.
What follows critically interprets Aristotle’s eudaimonia through a close reading of his
arguments. Once Aristotle’s eudaimonia is explicated, it is used to question the supposedly
subjective conception of happiness that the happiness literature argues is pervasive. Finally,
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is defended as a theory of well-being against a charge of perfectionism. It is
argued that Aristotle’s eudaimonia commits its adherents to maximising virtuous activity at all
times, that is, to perfect themselves. It is this interpretation of Aristotle that seeks to undermine
eudaimonia as a plausible theory of well-being, and I end this dissertation by providing a response to
the objection from perfectionism.
This project attempts, fundamentally, to show that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not simply an
intellectual curiosity: studying eudaimonia can help change the way we live our lives, and for the
better.
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Chapter I: Aristotle’s Eudaimonia
I.I Introduction
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics1 (EN) opens with an inquiry into the human good.
Since every sort of project one undertakes seeks a particular good, the good simpliciter will
be what all human endeavours ultimately aim toward.2 Referring to a number of practices
such as bridle-making, Aristotle argues that there are activities which are undertaken solely
for the sake of something else, since such activities are done for the sake of an end (e.g.
horsemanship) which is over and above bridle-making; the end of horsemanship is more
desirable than the end of bridle-making because bridle-making is pursued solely for the sake
of horsemanship.3 It is a final activity, or the product of such an activity, which Aristotle
seeks in order to give an account of what the human good consists of.4
Subordinate ends, those ends pursued for the sake of something else, as bridle-
making is pursued for horsemanship, are less desirable than sovereign ends, those ends for
which the subordinate ends are chosen.5 The most sovereign expertise is that of the
politician; political expertise contains the ends of other expertises, as political expertise
chooses what ends the city should pursue, and also chooses which, and to what extent, each
group of people should learn and practise each expertise.6 Because it is the most sovereign
and least subordinate, the end of political expertise must be the human good as it makes
use of, and itself contains, the other expertises in the city.7 Aristotle calls this chief good--
1 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans: Christopher Rowe. Commentary: Sarah Broadie. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
2 Aristotle’s argument supports the conditional conclusion: “If then, there is some end in our practical projects
that we wish for because of itself…” (EN I.2 1094a18-19). Since any individual undertaking seems to aim at
some particular good, if there is a good sought only for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else (the
good simpliciter), it will be known as the good “which all things seek” (EN I.1 1094a3). The good simpliciter is
the subject matter of EN.
3 EN I.1 1094a4-7.
4 EN I.1 1094a9-16.
5 EN I.1 1094a15-18.
6 EN I.2 1094a27-b3.
7 EN I.2 1094b4-8.
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that which is not sought for the sake of anything else8, “eudaimonia”9, but notes that there
is a dispute over what eudaimonia consists in.10
Aristotle argues that eudaimonia can be understood by looking at the characteristic
function of human beings: doing well as a human seems to reside11 in the characteristic
function of humans.12 The good for human beings is “the activity of the soul in accordance
with excellence and if there are more excellences than one, in accordance with the best and
most complete.”13 Aristotle adds in the following sentence that “furthermore it [the good
use of the function] will be this [eudaimonia] in a complete life.”14 At this stage Aristotle has
accomplished his initial goal: to sketch an outline of eudaimonia, and to fill in the details
later.15 There are many arguments which Aristotle must, and does, provide in order to fill in
the details, but the sketch he provides from the beginning of Book One of the EN to the end
of its seventh chapter is enough to create interpretive problems.
Aristotle’s function argument (FA) raises a problem in that the function (ergon) of
humans must be what is (idion),16 our distinguishing feature.17 The FA arrives at the
conclusion that the function of human beings is a practical life of rational activity, as the
8 EN I.7 1097a29-b22.
9 Eudaimonia is often rendered as ‘happiness’ in translations. To avoid problems which can crop up (e.g.
Cooper (2000), pg. 89, fn. 1) with such translations, I use the term eudaimonia to refer to Aristotle’s chief
human good. This will keep eudaimonia and ‘happiness’ distinct until I turn to compare the two in Chapter
Three.
10 EN I.4 1095a19-26.
11 ‘Reside’ means ‘to be located’ here. What doing well means, for a human, is located in an analysis of his
characteristic function.
12 EN I.7 1097b28.
13 EN I.7 1098a16-18.
14 EN I.7 1098a19-20 – insertions mine.
15 EN I.7 1098a21-22.
16 Idion is rendered as “peculiar to” in Rowe (2002, 1098a1) and in Kraut (1979, pg 467). Idion is understood
here to be a test for a “distinguishing feature of” humans; the feature of humans that distinguishes us from
other species (Liddell & Scott (1968, pg. 818, IV): “…but also, distinguishing feature in a relative sense…Arist.
Top.128b25”). Aristotle’s argument from 1097a32-b8 considers different candidates for the distinguishing
feature of humans. Idion first appears in the EN at I.7 1098a1: “we are looking for what is peculiar to human
beings.”
17 The FA is an argument that identifies eudaimonia (happiness) using an account of the human function as a
basis. Detailed discussion of the FA occurs in Section 1.2.1.
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capacity for and activity of reason simply is the characteristic work in which humans engage
in. A human who is functioning well is one whose activities are in accordance with reason,
and accompanied by their respective excellences.18 19 In EN Book X.7, Aristotle argues that
the activity in accordance with the best and most complete excellence, sophia,20 is
contemplation.21 However, there is a problem in understanding contemplation to be part of
the characteristic work in which humans engage, for the activity of the gods is also one of
reflection, and human reflective activity is valuable –more valuable than any other activity
available to us– in its affinity to the activity of the gods.22 If the conclusion of the FA is
meant to identify the human function, and thus what it means for us to do well, can
Aristotle claim that this reflective activity of ours23 is the distinguishing feature of human
beings, while being similar to the activity that the gods engage in continuously?24 As
Ackrill25 notes:
Aristotle has clearly stated that the principle of the ergon argument is that one must ask
what powers and activities are peculiar to and distinctive of man. He has answered by
referring to man’s power of thought; and that this is what distinguishes man from lower
animals is standard doctrine. But no argument has been adduced to suggest that one
type of thought is any more distinctive of man than another. In fact practical reason, so
far from being in any way less distinctive of man than theoretical, is really more so; for
man shares with Aristotle’s god the activity of theōria.26
Aristotle, having identified the human good with the use of reason in accordance with the
excellences, appears to be diverging from what is idion to us when he argues in EN Book X
18 EN I.7 1098a15-16. Aretē rendered as ‘excellence’ in Rowe (2002), as ‘virtue’ in Ross (1925). I treat
‘excellence’ and ‘virtue’ interchangeably.
19 The notion of proper excellence will be examined in I.2: The Function Argument.
20 Sophia: intellectual accomplishment.
21 EN X.7 1177a19.
22 EN X.8 1178b23-28.
23 Our activity is god-like, but not god-given. It comes from some process of learning or training, and practice
(EN I.9 1099b14-19).
24 Richard Kraut questions the FA in this way: “Does it (the FA) entail that our happiness does not consist in
contemplation? After all, we share this activity with Aristotle’s god, and so it is not in any straightforward way
peculiar to us” (Kraut, Richard. ‘The Peculiar Function of Human Beings’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy IX,
No. 3, 1979. Insertion mine.)
25 Ackrill, J.L. "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," Proceedings of the British Academy, 1974, reprinted in Essays on
Aristotle's Ethics, ed., A. O. Rorty, Berkeley 1980.
26 Ackrill (1974, pg. 352, Insertion mine).
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that the highest good for humans is located specifically in the excellent use of our
theoretical faculties. How can the distinguishing characteristic of human beings be
reflective activity if this does not distinguish between humans and gods? Aristotle argues
that an activity which is similar27 to the activity of the gods is the best activity that humans
can engage in, but since this reflective activity shares an affinity with the activity of the gods
it cannot be the proper conclusion of the function argument. The conclusion of the function
argument is the first problem I will discuss, because the distinguishing characteristic of
human beings must first be correctly ascertained in order to understand what it means for a
human to be functioning well according to Aristotle.
In EN Book X Aristotle returns to the FA and argues that man is an intelligence28 most
of all: intelligence is our distinguishing characteristic.29 A reading which emphasizes this
passage concludes that Aristotle has finally given his full answer to the question of what
eudaimonia consists in: “Happiness (eudaimonia) consists in just one good: this is the
virtuous exercise of the theoretical part of reason, that is, the activity called theōria.30 Every
other good (including the ethical virtues) is desirable for the sake of this one activity.”31
Theoretical activity is thus the activity in accordance with the ‘best and most complete’
excellence and eudaimonia is fully achieved in activity in accordance with this, and only this,
excellence. If eudaimonia were to consist solely in theoretical activity, there would be a
difficulty in reconciling this claim with the conclusion of the FA where Aristotle first states
that the human good is the activity of the soul in accordance with excellence (i.e., excellence
in general). When Aristotle states that “if there are more excellences than one, [activity of
the soul] in accordance with the best and the most complete” in Book I is he setting the
27 Aristotle refers to the relationship between human and divine contemplation as the human version bearing
“some kind of semblance of this sort of activity” (X.8 1178b28).
28 “And each of us would seem actually to be this, given that each is his authoritative and better element.” (EN
X.7 1178a3-4).
29 EN X.7 1178a4-7.
30
Theōria will be examined in detail in Chapter Two. For present purposes, it will suffice to have theōria 
understood as an activity in which one brings to mind the knowledge he already has; it is a reflective activity
where one is reflecting on the objects of theoretical wisdom (X.7 1177a24-27).
31 Kraut, Richard. Aristotle on the Human Good. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1989. Page 5,
insertions mine.
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stage for the arguments he provides in Book X?32 It seems as if Aristotle is providing two
accounts of eudaimonia, and a tension arises in interpretations between those which
understand eudaimonia simply as good theōria, and those which understand eudaimonia to
refer to a life filled with excellent activity in general.
Richard Kraut’s Aristotle on the Human Good interprets the role of theoretical and
practical excellent activity in a life in a remarkably clear way: “A life can contain ethical
activity without giving primacy to that activity—that is, without being a life in accordance
with ethical virtue.”33 On Kraut’s view, there is no upper limit to the positive contribution
that contemplation can give to one’s life.34 What follows from this, however, is that if I give
up a certain amount of contemplative activity in order to act in accordance with practical
excellence, I will be worse off than I would otherwise have been had I spent my time
contemplating. To argue that one is worse off for acting in accordance with practical
excellence as opposed to theoretical excellence does not sit well with some of the claims
that Aristotle himself makes in Book X, for example: “In so far as he is a human being, and
shares his life with others, he [the person engaged in reflective activity] chooses to do the
deeds that accord with excellence, and so he will need such things [resources] for the
purposes of living a human life.”35 A eudaimon will choose to act according to practical
excellence, and when he does, is he worse off for it? When one engages in practically
excellent activities is he missing out on what he could have had if he led a hermit-like
existence where he contemplated as much as possible and thus engaged in the activity that
the gods engage in continually? Understanding what Aristotle means by ‘complete
excellence’ is thus an important step towards defining eudaimonia.
Aristotle, in the sentence which follows the reference to the excellence which is ‘the
best and most complete’, completes his definition of eudaimonia with the requirement that,
whatever ‘complete excellence’ is, acting in accordance with it will only become eudaimonia
32 EN I.7 1098a16-18, insertions mine.
33 Ibid, page 25.
34 Ibid, pages 40-1. Kraut notes Aristotle’s conclusion that “to those who have more of reflection more
happiness belongs” (EN X.8 1178b30-31). He uses this passage and others to support his view that Aristotle is
committed to “the thesis that more contemplation is always better than less” (Kraut, 1989. P. 39, emphasis
mine).
35 EN X.8 1178b5-8, emphasis and insertions mine.
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in a complete life.36 When Aristotle says that “…a single swallow does not make spring, nor
does a single day; in the same way, neither does a single day, or a short time, make a man
blessed and happy [eudaimon]” is he implying that a ‘complete’ life simply refers to the
length of a life filled with excellent activity?37 On one reading eudaimonia is understood as
excellent activity together with a life long enough for this excellent activity to become
eudaimonia.38 Furthermore, on this reading external goods are necessary only insofar as
they promote excellent activity. On another reading ‘in a complete life’ refers to the length
of life and the need for external goods in addition to excellent activity. One cannot become
eudaimon instantaneously by acting in ways which are accompanied by excellence, nor can
one become eudaimon simply by engaging in excellent activity. It is not just excellent
activity that eudaimonia consists in: friends, health, honour and more are needed.
Eudaimonia is an ideal life which Aristotle will describe in the remainder of EN. But what
precisely does a complete life consist in, for Aristotle?
I have referred to four areas of inquiry in Aristotle in this introduction, and
interpretations of each of these areas will provide an account of what Aristotle’s
eudaimonia consists in. In this chapter, I will first lay out the FA and explain what the
conclusion of the FA means in terms of understanding what the human good is for Aristotle.
I will then devote the rest of this chapter to the role that idion occupies in Aristotle’s
account of eudaimonia. I will argue that the good theōria that humans engage in is the
distinguishing characteristic of human beings, for although Aristotle’s gods engage in
theōria, human beings are the only species that have physical limitations and also engage in
contemplation. I will turn to the questions I have outlined regarding ‘the best and most
complete’ excellence and ‘in a complete life’ in the second chapter. The first two chapters
of this dissertation are dedicated entirely to understanding exactly what Aristotle’s
eudaimonia is.
36 EN I.7 1098a18-19.
37 EN I.7 1098a19-20, insertion mine.
38 Brown, Eric. ‘Wishing for Fortune, Choosing Activity: Aristotle on External Goods and Happiness’.
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 21 (2005): 57-81.
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I.II The Function of Human Beings
The function of human beings consists of two aspects. The first is the FA itself: the
procedure by which Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that humans do have a typifying
activity. The second is the idion test, which ultimately selects what is peculiar to human
beings: to live an active life in accordance with reason. I explicate each aspect in turn.
I.II.I The Function Argument
Aristotle argues in Book I Chapter 7 of EN that for those who have a characteristic
function or activity, doing well seems to reside in that function.39 Aristotle turns to examine
human functioning as Plato does in the Republic. Aristotle argues that what it means for
one to do well, say as a flute-player, is for this person to exercise his characteristic activity
well: the good of a flute player resides in playing the flute well. Plato argues in a similar way
that the good of an art gives us a particular good, not a general one. For example, a doctor
who practices medicine well gives us good health, and a ship’s captain who is an expert at
navigation, safety at sea.40 What is common to both Aristotle and Plato is that they first
examine particular goods; what it means for a human being to do well as a doctor, or a
captain of a ship. But Aristotle wonders if a man, as a human being, has his own function. If
so, the function that is common to mankind would be where ‘doing well as a man’ would be
located: “So does a carpenter or a shoemaker have certain functions and activities, while a
human being has none, and is by nature a do-nothing?”41 This is a rhetorical question, for
Aristotle has already connected the good for a particular sort of human (experts in various
crafts) with the ends towards which these people typically aim. The examples of the
carpenter and the shoemaker are used by Aristotle to explain what having a characteristic
function entails. Having established what it means to have a characteristic function,
Aristotle turns to the question of what that function is for human beings, “if indeed there is
some function that belongs to [them].”42
39 EN I.7 1097b25-28.
40 Plato. Complete Works. ‘The Republic’ Trans: G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve in Cooper, 1997. Hackett
Publishing. Republic I. 346a4-5.
41 EN I.7 1097b28-30.
42 EN I.7 1097b28.
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Aristotle then turns to examine the parts of a human being: human eyes have a
characteristic function (seeing), just as human feet and hands do. Aristotle’s search for the
human function is one which arrives at its conclusion by rejecting candidates which are not
peculiar to humans. If there is a distinguishing feature of human beings, it cannot simply be
the function of living, because plants do so as well. Aristotle looks at different things
humans do: eat, grow, live, perceive and notes that plants and animals engage in this sort of
behaviour as well.43 So these things, though humans do grow, live, perceive, etc. cannot be
the distinguishing feature of human beings. While it is good for a human being to be eating
the right kind of food and getting a good amount of sleep, these are not activities which are
peculiar to a human being; a dog’s eating well is good for him. So the good for human
beings, being located in what the peculiar function of human beings is, cannot be something
which is shared by plants or animals. It would be absurd to reach a conclusion regarding the
characteristic function of humans that was shared with many other forms of life such as
oxen, horses and plants, for that would imply that there is no end at which humans
characteristically aim which sets us apart from these organisms.
Aristotle finally turns to the sort of life which appears to be distinctively human, and
this is a life that possesses reason, where possessing reason refers both to the ability to be
obedient to reason and the ability to use reason to think for oneself. We are obedient to
reason when we take advice from our parents, e.g., when we are advised to study hard and
to spend less time watching television. So in one sense our ‘possessing reason’ means that
we are receptive to the advice of other people, and Aristotle argues that this can be seen
given our custom for reprimanding or encouraging others.44 In the other sense of
‘possessing reason’, we are thinking creatures: we observe and interact with the world
around us and use our capacity for reason in an ongoing basis. The human function, our
distinguishing characteristic, is thus to lead an active life in which actions are in accordance
with reason. Being active in the way Aristotle describes here45 is to be active in a
distinctively human way. This faculty for reasoning is what allows humans to seek the good
43 EN I.7 1098a1-4.
44 EN I.13 1102b35-1103a1.
45 EN I.7 1098a7 for the reference to the “active life”.
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which animals and plants do not have a share in, namely, eudaimonia.46 The function of
human beings is not the “excellent use of reason”; it is to live and act accompanied by
reason.47 Reasoning actively is the distinguishing characteristic of humans. We are as
human as we can be when we engage in the active use of our capacity for reason, and the
excellent use of this characteristic function is what allows us to potentially become
eudaimones.
The FA is the way in which Aristotle arrives at the conclusion of what the function of
human beings is. Consider what the structure of the FA would look like on interpretations
which read the conclusion of the FA as the ‘excellent use of reason’:
i) Human beings have a characteristic function,48 and
ii) Since for any being that has a characteristic function, doing well is
understood to reside in that function,49 then
iii) The characteristic function of human beings is to reason
excellently.50
Reading the FA in this way is what motivates the identification of man’s good simply with
man’s function.51 This is analogous to arguing that since the function of a knife is to cut, an
46 EN I.7 1097b27-1098a19 & X.8 1178b28-29.
47 It is not clear to me that there is a substantive difference between “in accordance with reason” and “not
apart from reason” in Aristotle’s account. Broadie suggests that “accompanied by reason” can accurately
cover both phrases, even if they refer to different parts of the soul (Broadie, 2002 p. 277).
48 EN I.7 1098a8.
49 EN I.7 1097b27-28.
50 Gomez-Lobo, Alfonso. ‘The Ergon Inference’. Phronesis, Vol. XXXIV/2. 1989. Gomez-Lobo argues that this is
an incorrect interpretation of the ergon argument: “Virtually all commentators I have consulted fail to realize
that what Aristotle requires in the context, as a first step, is a neutral, purely descriptive specification of the
ergon of man” (Gomez-Lobo, 1989. P. 176). I agree with Gomez-Lobo, as the FA arrives at a descriptive
conclusion about what the function of human beings is and doing this well involves a separate step.
51 Kraut 1979, p.467 “…our function consists in the excellent use of reason” (emphasis mine). See also Ackrill
(1974), “Consideration of man’s ergon (specific function or characteristic work) leads Aristotle to the thesis
that eudaimonia, man’s highest good, is an active life of ‘the element that has a rational principle” (p. 351).
Ackrill here identifies eudaimonia directly with the function of man, where it should be identified with the
qualified exercise of the function: carrying out the function well. Kraut identifies our function with eudaimonia
(by identifying the function of human beings directly with its excellent use). Cooper (1975) appears to
understand the FA in the way I described: “a thing’s excellence is the essential condition of its performing well
its ergon” (p. 145, emphasis mine). A knife’s sharpness is the essential condition by which it cuts well.
Correspondingly, it is the excellences which are the essential condition by which human beings carry out an
active life, well.
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excellent knife is simply one that cuts. But even dull knives can cut, e.g. a butter knife can
cut a tomato. It will be a lengthy and tiresome process to complete, but this knife will cut
the tomato. However, we identify a good knife, rather, with one that is sharp and cuts well.
This is a separate evaluative step from the descriptive step which states that the function of
a knife is one of cutting. A knife that is very sharp will be an excellent knife, for it cuts very
well. The knife’s function (to cut), is carried out well when it is accompanied by its proper
excellence (sharpness).52 But what does this mean for humans? Firstly, to identify the
function of human beings directly with the excellent use of reason is an incorrect reading
when looking at what Aristotle actually says during the FA itself:
If the function of a human being is activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not
apart from reason, and the function, we say, of a given sort of practitioner and a good
practitioner of that sort is generically the same, as for example in the case of a cithara-
player and a good cithara-player, and this is so without qualification in all cases, when a
difference in respect of excellence is added to the function (for what belongs to the
citharist is to play the cithara, to the good citharist to play it well)—if all this is so, and a
human being’s function we posit as being a kind of life, and this life as being activity of
soul and actions accompanied by reason, and it belongs to a good man to perform these
well and finely, and each thing is completed well when it possesses its proper
excellence: if all this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in
accordance with excellence (and if there are more excellences than one, in accordance
with the best and most complete)53
Using the lengthy passage quoted above, I interpret the FA in the following way:
i) Mankind’s function is an active life in accordance with reason, and
ii) A cithara player and a good cithara player have generically the same function (playing
the cithara), and
iii) When one looks at differences in excellence one can ascertain whether or not a
function is being carried out well. So, since
52 Is it arbitrary to conclude that the ‘proper excellence’ of a knife is its sharpness? Imagine using a butter
knife to cut a tomato. It will cut the tomato with the proper application of force. But its dull edge will also spill
the pulp over the cutting board, and mangle the texture of the tomato. Cutting a tomato is necessary but not
sufficient for cutting it well. The act of cutting a tomato well (i.e. in distinct slices without mangling the
texture) is carried out by an instrument that is capable of carrying out this function (a knife, or any instrument
designed for slicing), and carrying it out well (a sharp one). Accurately distinguishing the excellence of the
knife would likely require an in depth analysis of the difference between slicing, cutting, mashing or squashing
a given tomato, which although interesting is not the point of the current thesis. It does not appear arbitrary
to me in any way to conclude that the excellence of a knife is its sharpness, for many knives cut, but the sharp
ones are the ones which do so well. A good member of the class of instruments which can cut is one which
cuts well, and it will cut well if it is sharp.
53 EN I.7 1098a8-1098a18.
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iv) The human function is a kind of active life where actions are accompanied by reason,
v) And a man who does this well does so when his actions are accompanied by their
respective excellences, then
vi) The good human being is one who leads an active life where his actions are
accompanied by reason (he is carrying out his function) and his actions possess their
respective excellences.
The use of the human function is thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
eudaimonia. Humans must54 and do have a distinguishing characteristic which typifies us: a
rational capacity, and our function consists in acting in accordance with this capacity.
However, this function is generically the same for all humans, and differences with respect
to excellence are needed in order to understand what it means for a human to do well. Just
as a bad flute player and a good flute player make the same generic sounds (i.e. flute
sounds) whilst playing the flute, the person who plays the flute well is the one we say is
doing well as a flute player. For Aristotle, the use of reason is necessary as a generic
function, but the difference in excellence is what must be looked at in order to differentiate
between a human being functioning per se and a human that is functioning well. With this
in mind, Aristotle provides an evaluative criterion by which to understand the good of
human beings. The good human will be human in that his actions are accompanied by
reason and good in that his actions are in accordance with the relevant excellence(s): “each
thing is completed well when it possesses its proper excellence.”55 The goodness of a
human’s actions supervenes on the actions being excellent, not simply on a human’s acting.
Of course, it is not as easy a task to understand the excellence of a human as it is for a knife.
A knife’s excellence is sharpness, but can every possible human action be evaluated by a
single excellence? For present purposes, it will suffice to have shown that Aristotle’s FA is
meant simply to provide a description of what human function is. The analysis with respect
to excellence is separate from the FA; an evaluation which looks at an action and seeks to
see whether or not this action is courageous, cowardly or foolhardy.56 But even if the FA
provides a descriptive conclusion and the evaluation of excellence occurs at a stage separate
from the descriptive stage, the description of the distinguishing characteristic of humans
54 Else there would be nothing over and above sustenance (the life of oxen) that we aim towards.
55 EN I.7 1098a15-16.
56 Courage is treated explicitly by Aristotle in EN III.6 – III.9.
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appears to be controversial: as was said earlier, how can what is idion to man, man’s
distinguishing characteristic, also be an activity of the gods?
I.II.II The Idion test
When Aristotle examines the excellences in EN Book I, he refers to them as ‘human
excellences’, because it is the good of human beings that he is inquiring about.57
Eudaimonia consists in rational activity in accordance with “complete excellence.”58 He
goes on in the same chapter to include intellectual accomplishment as a human excellence;
an intellectual one.59 By the end of EN Book I, Aristotle has mentioned theoretical
excellence, and furthermore counted it amongst human excellences. So from the onset,
theoretical excellence is part of the distinguishing feature of human beings, and theoretical
activity is a part of the human good, eudaimonia. In I.7 of EN, Aristotle leaves the best and
most complete excellence unspecified. In Book X of EN Aristotle argues that reflective
activity is the highest activity available to us, and it remains to be seen how this activity is a
satisfactory conclusion of the FA, if it cannot pass the idion test.60
The idion test begins when Aristotle states that doing well, for those who have a
characteristic function or activity, seems to reside in their function. This is the case for
humans, then, if there is “some function that belongs to him [them].”61 Though ‘idion’ itself
is rendered as ‘peculiar to’ and occurs in the text at a later point,62 the idion test consists in
Aristotle’s search for a function that ‘belongs’ to mankind. Noting the possessive emphasis
on the phrase ‘belongs to’ is Aristotle implying at this point that the ergon which belongs to
man must be an activity which is uniquely his? Nothing in the text explicitly supports this.
At this point in the text we can be sure only that Aristotle is looking for an activity which
properly characterizes mankind and captures what mankind is. This characteristic activity
will be the typifying work or activity that belongs to man because of what he is. This activity
might turn out to be absolutely peculiar to man; however this requirement is not part of
57 EN I.13 1102a15-16.
58 EN I.13 1102a5.
59 EN I.13 1103a6.
60 EN X.7 1177a20-21.
61 EN I.7 1097b29, emphasis and insertion mine.
62 EN I.7 1098a1.
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Aristotle’s selection process. The occurrence of the phrase ‘belonging to’ here is not
sufficient to read Aristotle as looking for something which is absolutely peculiar to man. For
it is clear that if x belongs to y, it does not necessarily follow that x cannot also belong to z; x
‘belonging to’ y does not entail x ‘belonging solely to’ y. So it seems that what Aristotle is
seeking need not be absolutely peculiar to humans.
Aristotle begins his search by looking at different sorts of human beings (e.g., flute
players) before moving to the parts of the body (e.g., eye, foot), but when he finally turns to
candidates for the human function he ends up rejecting living, nutrition, growing and
perception. He rejects being alive as the human function by arguing that this is ‘shared by
plants too’63 and he rejects perception because this ‘too is evidently shared, by horses,
oxen, and every other animal.’64 It seems plausible, emphasizing the way in which Aristotle
rejects the characteristics, to read the idion test, in its search for the distinguishing
characteristic of human beings, to be searching for what is peculiar to man where ‘peculiar
to’ means what no other organism shares in. On this reading it is implicit in Aristotle’s
argument that what is peculiar to humans is so absolutely; what is peculiar to humans must
not be shared by any other living creature. Yet it is precisely on this reading of Aristotle that
the problem of ‘peculiar to’ is generated. If what is idion to us must be absolutely peculiar
to us, then our distinguishing characteristic must be something which nothing else shares.
Yet if this is the case, it is argued that Aristotle would not be able to conclude that
theoretical activity is part of the human function, as his gods reflect as well.
A possible solution at this point would be to argue that there is a difference in kind
between human and divine contemplation. This allows human contemplation to be peculiar
to humans and divine contemplation to be peculiar to the gods. Read thus, there would be
no problem in humans and gods engaging in the same activity.65 Aristotle argues that the
63 EN I.7 1097b34
64 EN I.7 1098a3-4
65 Kraut, 1979, p. 472-473. Kraut argues that there is a difference in kind between human and divine
contemplation, but does not use this as his preferred response to the idion problem, as he believes this
difference in kind puts Aristotle in a philosophically awkward position. I treat his claim that Aristotle is arguing
for a difference in kind between divine and human contemplation here, and his proposed solution to the
problem later in this section.
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gods are thought to be alive, and if alive then in activity.66 It would be strange to ascribe to
the gods practical activities such as monetary transactions, as the activity of the gods is
superior in its blessedness, and practical activities simply do not seem to be what gods
engage in, being blessed and eudaimon to the highest degree.67 Since the gods are thought
to be alive, in activity, blessed and eudaimon to the highest degree, they must lead lives
which contain no practical doings as such activities are unworthy68 of the gods. The only
productive activity left is one of reflection and this is what the gods engage in.69 A human
life is blessedly eudaimon in that, to some extent, there belongs to the human life “some
kind of semblance of this sort of activity.”70 However, Aristotle does not provide a detailed
account of the differences between human reflective activity and that of the gods. On one
hand Aristotle shows that there is a difference in the duration of the reflective activity in
that “…the life of gods is blessedly happy [eudaimon] throughout…”71 It is impossible for us
to always be in that state because the gods exist eternally and we are mortals.72 The gods
engage in this blessed activity on a continual basis, and so are blessedly eudaimon
constantly. Kraut argues further that there is more than a difference in duration between
human and divine reflective activity according to Aristotle. He argues that there is a
difference in kind between human and divine reflective activity using the following:
If, then, god is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our
wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And god is in a better state.73
66 EN X.8 1178b19-20.
67 EN X.8 1178b9-16.
68 EN X.8 1178b17-19. I do not take Aristotle here to be undermining the value of practical activities for human
beings. I read him as making a point regarding that these practical activities (e.g. being courageous) mean very
little to the gods. What could a god need courage and moderation for? Aristotle’s god does not have “bad
appetites” (X.8 1178b17) so it is clear why Aristotle would see practical activities as being unworthy of the
gods. The gods lead the most blessed and eudaimon existence, and from such a position practical activities
must appear petty.
69 EN X.8 1178b19-22.
70 EN X.8 1178b27.
71 EN X.8 1178b26-7.
72 Aristotle, Metaphysics. Trans: Ross, W. D. (1948). XII.7-9.
73 Metaphysics XII.7 1072b23-26.
MPhil – George Grech
Aristotle’s Eudaimonia and Two Conceptions of Happiness
16
In the quoted sections from EN X.8 and the Metaphysics Aristotle’s argument clearly shows
that there is a temporal difference between human and godly reflective activity, and
Kraut,74 using the Metaphysics, attempts to further show via a conditional:
i) If gods are always in that good state that we are sometimes in, our wonder is
compelled (emphasis mine), and
ii) If gods are in a better state, then our wonder is compelled even more.
iii) And gods are in a better state.
iv) But since gods are always in the same state,
v) Then gods are always in a better state than we are in (iii and iv).
vi) Since gods are always in a better state, which is one of constant reflective activity,
there must be a difference in kind between human and divine reflective activity. If
humans could engage in the same kind of reflective activity that gods engage in,
then we would sometimes be in the same state as gods. Since we are never in the
same state as gods, we cannot be engaging in the same activity as God.75
The activity of the gods is “most good and eternal.”76 So gods are always in the best state:
an activity of pure, self-reflective thought. Though reflective activity in itself is what deals
with what is best in itself (reflective activity per se), it is reflective activity “in the fullest
sense with that which is best in the fullest sense” which the gods engage in.77 Human
beings can thus engage in reflective activity, but of a sort that is neither the same in
duration nor in kind as what the gods engage in; the purest form of reflective activity.
However, if the differences in both kind and duration were true, Aristotle would be
hard-pressed to draw any sort of relationship between human and godly reflective activity
at all. He would not be able to argue that this reflective activity is the best activity for us,
even though it is so vastly different from the activity of the gods, because it would be so
different from the activity of the gods. The differences between the respective reflective
74 Kraut himself does not develop the argument except to declare after quoting from the Metaphysics that “it
is clear that the difference between divine and human contemplation does not consist solely in the former’s
greater duration; a difference in kind also exists” (Kraut, 1979, p. 473). I attempt to develop an argument for
what Kraut believes to be obvious from the relevant passage from the Metaphysics.
75 Unfortunately, why Kraut believes that this difference must result in a difference in kind is not stated in his
paper. I attempted here to construct what Kraut might have said to argue for the difference in kind between
human and divine contemplation.
76 Metaphysics XII.7 1072b28.
77 Metaphysics XII.7 1072b18-20.
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activities would undermine the value that human contemplative activity is supposed to
derive from the activity of the gods: if the differences held, the activities would not be
similar enough for human reflective activity to be valued in its affinity to that of the gods.
In fact it is rather implausible to read Aristotle as arguing for a difference in kind
between human and divine reflective activity. Kraut grounds his view that there is a
difference in kind between human and divine reflective activity in the way argued above: he
reads the Metaphysics as advocating this difference in kind.78 Since Kraut believes that
Aristotle is arguing that his gods are permanently in a better state than we are ever in, it is
inferred that no activity we engage in can match that of the gods, otherwise we would be in
that same state, at least for small periods of time. So the activities are different both in
duration and kind on Kraut’s view. However, that our reflective activity does not match that
being engaged in by the gods does not necessarily entail a difference in kind.
Kraut’s argument in support of the difference in kind is simply incompatible with
what Aristotle actually argues earlier in Metaphysics XII. Aristotle’s gods are eternal, most
good and alive (so in activity).79 From this Aristotle concludes that gods live a life that is
continuous and eternal; these are the properties of divine life. However, the gods are not
always in a better state than ours. Though Kraut rightly points out that Aristotle believes
the gods to be in a better state overall than that of humans, that is, a divine life is better
than a human life, he is wrong to conclude that this means that humans are never, even
temporarily, in a state which shares a strong affinity with that state in which the Gods are in
constantly. Aristotle has already qualified the difference between the human and divine life
earlier, because the gods enjoy a life “…such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a
short time80 (for [God] is ever in this state, which we cannot be)…”81 Aristotle thinks that
humans, when they engage in this reflective activity, are engaging in the best possible
78 I wish to clear up a point regarding Kraut’s position. Kraut does argue that there is a difference in kind
between human and divine contemplation, however he does not believe that we should use this difference to
conclude that “although contemplation simpliciter is not peculiar to man, human contemplation is.” His
solution to the problem of the idion test is one of relative peculiarity, which I discuss in the following pages.
79 Metaphysics XII 1072b27-30.
80 Aristotle notes that we can only enjoy this sort of a life as humans for very short periods of time, though we
should try to enjoy this reflective activity “…even if it is small in bulk” (EN X.7 1178a2).
81 Metaphysics XII.7 1072b13-15, emphasis and insertion mine.
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activity.82 But the entirety of the divine life consists in eternal reflective activity, so the life
of the gods is something which we can only assimilate to given that we are humans.83
Note that when Aristotle is comparing human and divine lives he is referring to the
eternal, continuous activity of the gods as the very life of the gods.84 The continuity of
divine reflective activity is dependent on the nature of the gods: they do not need to engage
in practical activities, so their reflective activity continues unimpeded. That it is eternal
activity is also derived from the gods being eternal themselves and engaging in this, and
only this, activity. The reflective activity of the gods is more pure than ours is because the
gods are not distracted or taken away from the activity by anything else, but humans often
are. The human function is to lead the active life of what possesses reason, and since this
life necessarily includes practical actions, we cannot lead an existence which consists
entirely of contemplation. Furthermore it is difficult to imagine a eudaimon human life that
consisted solely in reflective activity, and Aristotle himself argues that simply in virtue of
being human, a life of reflective activity would require other goods such as nourishment and
bodily health.85 Humans cannot lead the lives that the gods do because as humans, we have
other concerns which preoccupy us including political and private concerns: other activities
which are also governed by excellences. The gods and humans both engage in reflective
activity, but humans contemplate in a different context: as mortal beings who can engage in
reflective activity sometimes, but not as frequently as the gods do.
It is the eternal continuity of the activity of the gods which causes Aristotle to
distinguish between the lives that humans and gods lead. Because we are mortal, we
cannot lead the same lives as Aristotle’s gods. However, insofar as we are capable of this
reflective activity we can assimilate to the life of Aristotle’s gods who delight in what, in
humans, has the greatest affinity to their existence: the use of intelligence in the life of an
intellectually accomplished person. Even though humans cannot engage in reflective
activity as frequently and continuously as the gods, humans do engage in a reflective activity
82 The details of Aristotle’s argument for why theoretical activity is considered the best one will be provided in
Chapter Two.
83 EN X.8 1177b35.
84 Metaphysics XII.7 1072b28-30.
85 EN X.8 1178b33-35.
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which shares a strong affinity with the activity of the gods. It is this affinity between the two
activities that is the reason why Aristotle draws a comparison between the two in the first
place, and furthermore is the reason why there cannot be a difference in kind between
human and divine reflective activity. A difference in duration and kind between the two
activities would mean that a human would be rightly sceptical about the affinity (and
therefore value) his contemplation derives from the activity of the gods.
Kraut argues that two different kinds of reflective activity could provide a solution to
the problem of whether or not reflective activity is in fact idion to man. One could use the
difference in kind to argue that human contemplation is the distinguishing feature of
humans because it is different from a) what any lower species engages in, as no other
species contemplates (absolutely different) and b) similar enough to the activity of the gods
for it to be more blessed than any other excellence we can engage in, yet different enough
from the activity of the gods such that it is still a peculiarly human activity. Human reflective
activity is peculiar to humans, not reflective activity per se.86
Though Kraut does argue that there is a difference in kind between human and
divine reflective activity according to Aristotle, he believes that if Aristotle were to actually
posit specifically human theoretical activity as the distinguishing feature of human beings,
then he would be in an awkward philosophical position: he would be confining humans to
exercising only their peculiar function.87 If human beings were able to overcome human
limitations and engage in the very same reflective activity that the gods engage in, Aristotle
would not be able to advise humans to pursue that, for divine reflective activity is not idion
to humans.88
However, Aristotle understood human beings as having certain limitations in virtue
of being human, such as being mortal.89 If those limitations changed, it would mean that we
are not human as Aristotle understands anymore and therefore our function would change.
Presumably one of the human limitations we would have to overcome in order to engage in
86 Kraut (1979, pg 473).
87 Kraut (1979, p. 473).
88 Kraut (1979, p. 473).
89 I am not sure how one could suppose that this is possible, but that is a separate issue.
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precisely their continuous reflective activity would be mortality. If there were immortal
humans,90 their function would be peculiar to immortal humans: and if they could engage in
the activity of the gods as they do, they would no longer be human. Aristotle understands
human functioning to be what is particular to humans. Were humans to become god-like in
nature (i.e. partake in eternal life) they would no longer be human, and the idion test would
run relative to what is peculiar to this human-god hybrid. But as was argued earlier, there is
no difference in kind between human and divine reflective activity. In what sense, then, is
reflective activity peculiar to humans?
One possible response to this question, which Kraut brings forth, is to seek to qualify
the idion test more precisely. For what the idion test looks for on this view is not the
distinguishing feature of human beings which distinguishes us absolutely from all other life
forms, but rather what distinguishes us from “all lower form[s] of life, i.e. animals and
plants.”91 It does not, however, clarify the relation that humans and gods share in the
activity of contemplation. In response, Richard Kraut uses a second form of peculiarity92 in
order to provide a solution to the problem of both gods and men sharing in theōria: relative
peculiarity. This form of peculiarity does not require that what is idion to us to be unique to
us, it simply requires rather that what is idion to us is peculiar to us relative to plants and
animals. Against this reading is that nowhere in the relevant passage in EN I.7 has Aristotle
said this. However, he also does not say there that what is idion to us needs to separate us
from every other life form: he does not explicitly qualify here what form of peculiarity he is
using.
Is Aristotle in EN I.7 looking for something which is relatively peculiar to us? It would
be ad hoc to interpret Aristotle as employing the idion test simply in order to separate us
90 Human beings, obviously, are mortal. The point here is that in order to overcome our human limitations and
enjoy “precisely that kind of contemplation which Aristotle’s god enjoys” would require us to become
immortal (i.e., to do the impossible for humans).
91 Kraut, 1979, p. 476.
92 Kraut draws a distinction between absolute and relative peculiarity from Aristotle’s Topics I.5 In Topics,
Aristotle argues that learning grammar is absolutely (haplōs) peculiar to humans, because we are the only
organisms that can do this. He argues that bipedness is relatively (pros ti) peculiar to humans when compared
with horses and dogs, because among these animals only man is a biped. Since Aristotle does not qualify idion
as either pros ti or haplōs in I.7 of EN, Kraut suggests that we interpret the peculiarity in question to be
relative. Kraut, 1979. P. 475.
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from lower life forms, seeking what is peculiar to us only relative to plants and animals and
then to group us together with the gods93 in EN X when it turns out that our best excellence
is something which the gods share in as well. I argue this interpretation of relative
peculiarity to be ad hoc precisely because Aristotle does not qualify his use of idion to
simply be searching for a way to separate human beings from lower life forms. Reading
Aristotle’s ‘peculiar to’ as a relative form of peculiarity is to interpret Aristotle as employing
a test that only works to separate us from plants and animals, where he proposes
candidates for the peculiar human function in EN I.7, and then to reject those candidates
whenever they are shared in part with plants and animals, but drop the test entirely and
accept an activity when it turns out that the gods engage in this activity as well.
Aristotle need not be committed to this relative peculiarity because the idion test is
not working in the negative sense – simply to reject candidates for eudaimonia. It is
working in the positive sense: to figure out, given what human beings are, what the
distinguishing function is in virtue of being a human. Candidates are proposed by looking at
various human functions (sleeping etc), but these are rejected because they are the
typifying activities of plants and animals. If Aristotle is seeking what is relatively peculiar to
human beings, then the idion test only works to distinguish us from lower species and in this
sense it is not really an idion test: it only seeks to separate us from lesser animals. However,
if what Aristotle is seeking is absolutely peculiar to human beings, then the idion test truly
seeks the typifying work of humans, then the reflective activity of the gods cannot be what
is peculiar to us, or so it has seemed thus far.
The idion test seeks what is absolutely peculiar to humans, and to understand the
idion test in this way we must look at how precisely Aristotle understands humans in EN
Book X. Each species on Aristotle’s view is best understood by its authoritative and better
element.94 Aristotle understands what a creature is by looking at what that creature is at its
best. Plants simply live, oxen graze and perceive, and so on. These are the typifying
activities of the respective species. Humans are alive, and they eat and perceive as animals
do. But this is not the better element of humans: the element which Aristotle argues is
93 Kraut, 1979, p. 476.
94 EN X.7 1178a3-4.
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authoritative in humans is our intelligence. Our intelligence is what Aristotle understands
man to be most of all.95 It is because humans are intelligent that we are able to sometimes
engage in the reflective activity that the gods engage in continually.
Kraut interprets Aristotle as arguing that beings with the same type of soul are
grouped together for the purposes of understanding their characteristic activities, and thus
men and gods are grouped together for their rational faculties.96 This grouping allows
reflective activity to be relatively peculiar to man: peculiar relative to plants and animals. By
interpreting Aristotle’s idion test to be seeking only what is relatively peculiar to humans,
Kraut need not worry that reflective activity cannot be absolutely peculiar to man because
gods engage in this activity as well. Relative peculiarity allows, on Kraut’s view, human
beings and gods to engage in reflective activity that is different in kind and duration, but still
generically what is called reflective activity: the gods simply do it much better than we can.
This is, however, a mischaracterization of Aristotle’s argument. What Aristotle is in
fact looking for is what is absolutely peculiar to man because this is what man’s work is.
Aristotle has spent the entirety of the EN engaging various questions relating to the human
good: he is attempting to answer what human eudaimonia consists in. When Aristotle looks
at plants and divides off simply ‘living’ from the human function, he does so for the
conjunction of i) this work is peculiar to plants and ii) this is not the activity which is peculiar
to humans, though we are alive. And similarly, even though we take in nutrition, grow and
perceive, these are not the typifying activities of humans. Humans engage in much more
than these activities, whereas plants can directly be characterized as simply ‘living’, for all
they do is with the aim of continuing to live (e.g., adapting the growth structure to gain
more exposure to the sun, taking in water and nutrients from the soil, and so on). That is,
there is no further end towards which plants aim. It is not surprising that Aristotle would
think that there is something over and above this, and the other candidates which he rejects
as potentially characteristic of humans, for humans. What the idion test seeks therefore is
to show what typifies humans: to find what activity, if any, all humans can be typified by.
95 EN X.7 1178a7.
96 Kraut, 1979, p. 476.
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I have argued that there is no difference in kind between human and divine
reflective activity and also claimed that the typifying activity of humans will be one that is
absolutely peculiar to them. In the Metaphysics Aristotle argues that at least sometimes,
humans are in the same state as that of the gods. Clearly he does not mean the same
existence overall: we are mortals and have physical representations (our bodies). The state
he is referring to is one of contemplation. There are times when we have enough spare
time and are free enough from distraction that we can engage in contemplation: an activity
which is precisely the same as that activity of the gods. The idion test thus separates us
from animals (for they have physical limitations but share nothing in reflective activity), and
gods (for they have no physical limitations but constantly engage in reflective activity).
Humans are the only creatures which have both physical limitations and engage in reflective
activity within the mortal context, so what typifies humans is an active life in accordance
with the excellences, and excellent reflective activity can be part of the set of activities in
accordance with excellence for it is pursued within the context of being a human being and
thus does not violate the idion test.
I.III Conclusion
One problem with interpreting the idion test in this way, that it does indeed seek
what is absolutely peculiar to humans, and that it is human reflective activity which is this, is
that it is not human reflective activity which is most peculiar to humans. Since human
reflective activity has a strong affinity to the activity of the gods, it is less a distinctive
human characteristic than practical, excellent activity.97 If the interpretation thus far works,
it still has not met Ackrill’s problem. What has been argued so far is that human reflective
activity is the same activity of the gods, but since it is carried out within the human context
the activity does not have the same duration or continuity as that of the gods, and thus does
not violate the idion test. So if human reflective activity is the most distinguishing feature of
humans, it still needs to be shown why this activity is peculiar to us to a greater extent than
practical activity is. What Book X shows is that the best excellence we have available to us
as humans is reflective activity. This is, as a human excellence, grouped with the rest of the
excellences in EN Book I.98 The idion test seeks the distinguishing feature of human beings,
97 Ackrill, J.L. (1974, p. 352).
98 EN I.13 1103a6-8.
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and both practical and theoretical excellence pass the idion test. The FA’s ‘best and most
complete’ excellence does not refer exclusively to reflective activity because the conclusion
of the FA is meant to indicate what eudaimonia consists in. For Aristotle, the self-sufficiency
of eudaimonia does not entail that it is something pursued by oneself or “for the person
living a life of isolation, but also for one’s parents, children, wife, and generally those one
loves, and one’s fellow citizens, since man is by nature a civic being.”99 Only exercising one’s
intelligence would not meet the requirement of being human; a civic being. So even though
the best activity available to humans is human reflection, this is not the sum total of what
Aristotle’s eudaimonia consists in. It is, however, an undeniable part of eudaimonia. And
since eudaimonia consists in acting in accordance with the ‘best and most complete’
excellence and furthermore ‘in a complete life’, I shall now turn to an examination of what
Aristotle means by these phrases.
99 EN I.7 1097b9-11.
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Chapter II: The Best and Most Complete Excellence in a
Complete Life
II.I Introduction
As was argued in Chapter One, the function of human beings, according to Aristotle,
is to lead a practical life accompanied by reason. Understanding how to evaluate if a human
is living well is a separate question. The human good, what the best life for human beings
consists in, is exercising the human function well: to lead a life of activity in accordance with
the excellences. But Aristotle in EN I.7100 provides a further qualification of the human
good, such that if there turns out to be more than one excellence, the human good is a life
of activity in accordance with the one that is best and most complete.101 Aristotle’s
discussion in EN X.7-8 shows that, on his view, intelligence is the best and most complete
excellence. Aristotle defines theoretical activity as the use of our intellects.102 That
according to Aristotle, good reflective activity is activity in accordance with the best
excellence, namely our intelligence, is undeniable.103 Where disagreement arises, however,
is in understanding the role of reflective activity with respect to the human function. When
Aristotle refers to the best and most complete excellence in EN Book I, he may be
interpreted here to be directly referring to the single excellence of intellectual
accomplishment.104 Yet even if we accept the claim that Aristotle does indeed argue in
Book X105 that there is a single excellence which is the best and most complete, we are not
committed to saying that it is this singular excellence that Aristotle refers to in the
conclusion of the function argument.
100 EN I.7 1098a16-18.
101 What ‘the best and most complete’ represent in Aristotle’s account will be turned to in II.II.
102 EN X.7 1177a20-21.
103 EN X.7 in its entirety, but especially X.7 1177a19-21.
104 Kraut, Richard. Aristotle on the Human Good. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1989 p. 197. Kraut
refers to other scholars that take “the best and most perfect virtue” to be referring directly, and only to,
theoretical wisdom (in this work, intellectual accomplishment). He proceeds to argue that this view is correct.
105 Kraut interprets Aristotle as arguing for a single best excellence in Book X.8: “to those who have more of
reflection more happiness belongs too” (X.8 1178b30-33). See Kraut, 1989 p. 46.
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This chapter begins with a discussion of reflective activity (theōria).106 Explicating
theōria will assist us in understanding what Aristotle means by activity in accordance with
the ‘best and most complete’ excellence. Once theōria has been properly understood, how
this excellent activity interacts with the rest of excellent activity will be examined. This
chapter engages two critical questions regarding Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia.
First, the relationship between practical and theoretical excellences will be examined. Is it
the case, as Richard Kraut argues, that in the life of the philosopher every good aside from
excellent theōria, including ethically excellent activity, is desirable solely for the sake of
excellent theōria?107 Kraut maintains that the philosopher’s life has excellent theōria as its
ultimate end. The politician’s life is distinguished from the philosopher’s life as having the
active use of the practical virtues as its ultimate end, but is therefore less eudaimon.108
Aristotle considers in Book X the respective lives of the philosopher and the politician. What
distinguishes these two lives is the way in which each life is actively characterized. The life
of the philosopher is characterized as active in the theoretical sense; reflective activity is the
distinct facet of the philosopher’s life. Yet ethically excellent activity is not excluded, for the
philosopher chooses to do these things, i.e. things of ethical significance, because he is
human; he lives and shares his life with other people.109 On the other hand, the politician’s
life is a life that is characterized by practical excellent activity alone. Kraut’s argument is
that the best life, according to Aristotle, is that of the philosopher, and in that life, ethical
virtue is chosen for the sake of theōria.
Aristotle argues that theōria is the best activity that humans can engage in, and
Kraut rightly puts this activity at the top of a hierarchy of goods.110 On Kraut’s view, though,
106
Theōria is translated as ‘reflective activity’, ‘contemplation’, or simply referred to as ‘theōria’ in (Aristotle.
Nicomachean Ethics. Trans: Christopher Rowe. Commentary: Sarah Broadie. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), (Kraut, 1989) and (Ackrill, J.L. ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, Proceedings of the British Academy,
1974, reprinted in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed., A. O. Rorty, Berkeley 1980) respectively. Each of these
represents the purely contemplative activity that Aristotle holds to be the “complete happiness [eudaimonia]
of man” in Book X (EN X.7 1177b25).
107 Kraut, 1989. Pg. 5.
108 The life of the politician is “second happiest”, and is a life in accordance with “the rest of excellence” (X.8
1178a9-10).
109 EN X.8 1178b5-8.
110 Kraut, 1989. Pg. 6.
MPhil – George Grech
Aristotle’s Eudaimonia and Two Conceptions of Happiness
27
this means that ethically excellent activity is done, in the life of the philosopher, with the
intent of promoting good reflective activity; the ethically excellent activities are chosen for
their own sake in the life of the politician and for the sake of good theōria in the life of the
philosopher.111 In this chapter I shall be arguing that even though theōria is the best activity
we can engage in, this superiority does not subordinate the practical excellent activities to
it; that even though theōria is above practical virtues at the top of the tree which represents
the life of the philosopher, this does not mean that the latter are only chosen for the sake of
the former, and thus subordinated by theōria. The practical virtues make an independent
contribution to, or have an independent place in, understanding the eudaimonia of the
philosopher. I will argue that although it is the case that being an excellent person can help
one be a better philosopher, this is not the only way in which the practical and theoretical
excellences are linked in the life of the philosopher, and therefore show that Kraut’s
argument is not successful. My counter position will rest on pointing to passages in the EN,
where I believe Aristotle shows that the practical excellences are chosen for their own sake
by any eudaimon individual.112 As human beings, it is these excellences that will help us
interact well with each other; they play a major role in the life of a political or philosophical
eudaimon, and make an independent contribution to the philosopher’s eudaimonia; one
which is separate from the contribution that theōria makes.
The second part of this chapter provides an interpretation of the relationship
between goods such as pleasure and honour, and leading an active life in accordance with
the excellences. Are the goods in a human life, according to Aristotle, understood to be
valuable simply because they promote excellent activity? Is the quality of a life measured
with respect to excellence alone, or are there other ways in which a eudaimon life can
flourish, or falter? Section II.3 will turn to the second question: what are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a eudaimon life? There I will argue that virtuous activity, theoretical
or practical, is not sufficient for eudaimonia. Since eudaimonia is complete,113 nothing can
be added to a eudaimon life to make it better. This life must be complete as well, for as
111 Kraut, 1989. Pg. 25 fn 12 and pg. 343.
112 X.8 1178b6-8.
113 See fn. 115.
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Aristotle says, there are goods, the lack of which will be a stain on someone’s life.114 I will
interpret Aristotle to be claiming that the lack of these goods will be sufficient to deprive
someone of eudaimonia. These goods, on the other hand, are not sufficient for eudaimonia.
I will argue that Aristotle’s eudaimonia includes in it goods aside from the virtues which are
needed for a human life to go well. The deprivation of these goods need not, though it may
at times, diminish one’s ability to act virtuously. Nevertheless, it is not the amount of
virtuous activity alone which one’s eudaimonia is understood by. I will argue that Aristotle’s
ideal for humans, eudaimonia,115 requires virtuous activity and certain other goods in a
necessary conjunction.
II.II The Best and Most Complete Excellence
Thus far Aristotle’s usage of the phrase ‘the best and most complete’ has yet to be
explained in relation to his account of eudaimonia. It will be useful to quote relevant
sections of the EN here, as they will be used in the upcoming sections in order to elucidate
the characteristics of Aristotle’s eudaimonia.
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is both:
i) Complete (C): …most desirable of all things, it not being counted with other goods:
clearly, if it were so counted in with the least of other goods, we would think it
more desirable, for what is added becomes an extra quantity of goods, and the
larger total amount of goods is always more desirable,116 and
ii) Self-Sufficient (S): …what in isolation makes life desirable and lacking in nothing,
and we think eudaimonia is like this…117118
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is complete, which means that nothing could be added to a
eudaimon life to make it better, and self-sufficient, which means that it is the proper human
114 EN I.8 1099b2-6 & I.9 1099b28-29.
115 The life of the gods consists entirely in continuous, eternal excellent reflective activity. The gods have no
need for external goods, as humans do, and thus the eudaimonia of the gods is of the highest degree and most
complete. Philosophers can approach this type of completeness through good theōria, which shares an
affinity with the activity of the gods, because their activity is more (S) than any other human activity (EN
1178b8-27).
116 EN I.7 1097b16-20.
117 Both Roger Crisp in ‘Aristotle’s Inclusivism’ (1994) and J. L. Ackrill in ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’ (1974) use (S)
and (C) in their inclusive interpretations of Aristotle’s eudaimonia.
118 EN 1097b14-16, emphasis mine.
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good: by itself it makes a life desirable and lacking in nothing. The emphasized portions of
(C) and (S) represent what a eudaimon life must be. What the eudaimon life turns out to be
must therefore satisfy (C) and (S). (C) and (S) are the two criteria that must be satisfied by
an independent definition of a eudaimon life. A definition of the best human life
(eudaimonia) and how this account satisfies (C) and (S) will be given in II.3.119 They are
introduced here because when Aristotle refers to theōria, he argues that it is the best
human activity because it is the excellent activity characterized by (C) and (S).
Richard Kraut argues that (C) and (S) together prohibit an inclusive definition of
eudaimonia, i.e. that it includes other goods such as friendship and honour in addition to
the excellences, and no particular good is incommensurably more valuable than any
other.120 Rather, Kraut claims that eudaimonia “consists in virtuous activity alone.”121 Kraut
argues that the life of the philosopher is lived in accordance with theōria, because he
interprets the FA’s conclusion that “if there are more excellences than one, in accordance
with the best and most complete,”122 to be arguing that a philosopher lives a life that has
theōria as its ultimate end. What Kraut means by an ‘ultimate end’ is that all of the other
goods in that life are desired for the sake of theōria, that theōria is desired for itself, and
that it is not desired for the sake of any other good in that life.123
Kraut’s view is based upon his characterization of Aristotle’s discussion of theōria in
EN Book X, one that leads him to believe that according to Aristotle all living beings can be
ranked with respect to their eudaimonia using a single standard which ranks beings in a
hierarchy to the extent in which they approximate the lives of the gods. The gods represent
the highest possible eudaimonia because they engage in theōria eternally and continuously.
Human beings—because they are capable of engaging in theōria—can be ranked amongst
each other with respect to the way in which their lives represent the lives of the gods. The
human life that has theōria as its ultimate end is that of the philosopher. So on Kraut’s view,
philosophers lead lives which most resemble the life of the gods, because of the affinity that
119 II.3 ‘In a Complete Life’.
120 Ackrill (1974, p. 341).
121 Kraut, 1989. p. 9.
122 EN I.7 1098a17-18.
123 Kraut, 1989. Pg. 25.
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their lives have with that of the gods. Philosophers are the most eudaimon human beings
on Kraut’s view, because they meet the single standard that Kraut interprets Aristotle as
putting forward. Kraut calls this argument the “Argument from Divinity (AD).”124 Kraut uses
the AD to represent the standard by which the philosopher’s eudaimonia can be
understood.
Kraut interprets theōria to be the ultimate end in the life of the philosopher, because
on his view the philosopher lives a life in accordance with the best and most complete
excellence, his intellectual faculty.125 To support this interpretation, Kraut places particular
emphasis on portions of the AD, such as:
So [eudaimonia] too extends as far as reflection does, and to those who have
more of reflection more [eudaimonia] belongs too, not incidentally, but in virtue
of the reflection; for this is in itself to be honoured126
Kraut argues not only that the life of the philosopher is the most eudaimon because it bears
the highest resemblance to the lives of the gods (using the AD), but also that excellent
ethical activity is chosen for the sake of promoting this single standard in the life of the
philosopher. Kraut interprets Aristotle in EN Book X to be claiming both that excellent
reflective activity is the best activity we can engage in, and also that excellent ethical activity
will be done in the life of the philosopher for the sake of excellent theōria.
I will argue that Kraut’s first claim (A), that in the life of the philosopher everything is
chosen for the sake of theōria, is mistaken, but that his latter two (B1), that theōria is
desired for its own sake and (B2) not desired for the sake of any other good, are not. I now
turn to what Aristotle says about theōria in EN Book X in order to explain why he thinks that
it is the best excellent activity.
II.II.I Reflective Activity
We should imagine this excellent reflective activity to be what a scientist or a
philosopher engages in frequently: research. This activity is in accordance with the best
excellence, because it is activity in accordance with the highest of the things in us: our
124 Kraut, 1989. Pp. 39- 62. Referring to EN X.8 1178b21-32.
125 Kraut, 1989. Pg. 25.
126 EN X.8 1178b30-2.
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intelligence.127 Furthermore, the objects which are being contemplated by the philosopher
are the highest kind by their nature, e.g. “the constituent parts of the universe.”128
Contemplation is less fatiguing than other activities, for it is less dependent on external
goods than any other activity we engage in, and thus we can contemplate more
continuously than we can engage in other activities. One does not need much to
contemplate; moderate resources and his intelligence.129 Other excellent activities, such as
those the political life is characterized by, require more resources. The intellectually
accomplished person engages in the most stable and pleasant activity that we are capable
of.130 Contemplation is also more (S) than ethical activity, for one can engage in it by
himself,131 whereas ethically excellent activity is done within the context of associations
with other people: justice, for example, requires people to be the objects of, or participants
in, the relevant actions. Contemplation also aims at no end beyond itself, and is thus loved
for itself, for nothing is produced from it besides its activity. It is superior in this way to
practical pursuits, for they aim to produce something beyond their engagement.
The lives of the philosopher and the politician can be contrasted with respect to the
properties of theōria.  A politician, for example, aims at securing eudaimonia for himself and
his fellow citizens. The excellent use of political expertise is done because political activity is
worthwhile in itself (the expertise, as mentioned in Chapter I, is the most sovereign of the
expertises), but its exercise aims at securing other ends such as the eudaimonia of the
politician’s citizens. There are other activities inherent to the politician’s role in politics that
are required, such as attending various administrative meetings or meeting other politicians
and attempting to secure their support, etc. The politician’s life is not one of leisure; it is a
busy life. On the other hand, the philosopher is free to contemplate, and not consumed with
day-to-day political affairs. In this way, the politician’s life is inferior to the life of a
127 EN X.7 1177a20-21.
128 EN VI.7 1141b1-5, & X.7 1177a21-22. For Aristotle, these objects are worthy of serious attention and thus
their contemplation is viewed with respect to excellence; our intelligence.
129 EN X.8 1179a6.
130 EN X.7 1177a25-7. Especially “…of activities in accordance with excellence it is the one in accordance with
intellectual accomplishment that is agreed to be pleasantest…” (Emphasis mine. Note the superlative use
‘most pleasant’ with respect to reflective activity).
131 Though Aristotle does allow that a philosopher will contemplate better if he works with others, this is a
minimal claim, for the philosopher can still engage in contemplation by himself (see EN X.7 1177a35).
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philosopher; it is more busy and concerned with human affairs, whereas the philosopher’s
life is leisurely. Eudaimonia, Aristotle argues, is thought to reside in leisure from
business.132
Furthermore, a human being is able to contemplate because of the divine element in
him, and in this sense a life of contemplation is above the human plane; and since a human
being is meant to be identified with his sovereign element, intelligence, it is activity in
accordance with this virtue that represents the highest activity that we can engage in.133
Since contemplation is something divine, having the characteristics of what is assigned to
the gods, it is superior to activity in accordance with the rest of excellence.134 I will now
turn to examine Richard Kraut’s three claims labelled (A) and (B) earlier.135
As the ultimate end of the life of the philosopher, Kraut argues that a feature of
reflective activity is that it is (B2). Aristotle himself says that theōria is desired for itself, for it
is the person who loves intellectual accomplishment and actively exercises his
understanding who experiences its correlative pleasure: one which is amazingly pure and
stable.136 The pleasure involved in contemplation is not fleeting as the pleasure from food
or carnal endeavours can be. Contemplative activity is calm, leisurely, and unaffected by
external factors as other pleasures we experience are. A great meal gives me pleasure for
the duration of its consumption, so the pleasure derived from eating is dependent on my
being hungry, and requiring food. But contemplation is not so limited. The intellectually
accomplished person can engage in this reflective activity even when he is by himself.137 So
contemplation is an activity which is chosen only for its own sake. It is more (C) than any
other activity which we can engage in, because nothing can be added to the contemplative
activity to make it better.
132 EN X.7 1177b5 & 1177b22-23. I understand Aristotle to be making the point that researching is more
leisurely in its nature than political activity is, because the latter requires political pursuits which keep the
politician very busy, whilst researching itself is a calmer and less tiring enterprise.
133 EN X.7 1177b27-30.
134 EN X.7 1177b22-30.
135 See page 6.
136 EN X.7 1177a25-27.
137 EN X.7 1177a33-4.
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Kraut also argues that a feature of theōria, as an ultimate end, is that it is (B1).
Again, this follows directly from Aristotle’s description of contemplation. On Aristotle’s
view, nothing accrues from reflective activity besides the act of reflecting itself, and is thus
more (S) than any other activity in which we can engage. On Kraut’s view, the presence or
absence of theōria in one’s life is the criterion by which we evaluate one’s eudaimonia. The
intellectually accomplished person already has the tool that he needs for living the life of a
philosopher and he does not need other people in order to engage in this activity. As long
as the philosopher has the adequate resources for the purposes of exercising his knowledge
such as health and sustenance, he will be able to lead the life of a philosopher that Kraut
believes Aristotle holds in such high regard. This life of the philosopher is the best form of
eudaimonia, the best life that a human being can live, because it is the life characterized by
theōria. According to Kraut, it is this single criterion that Aristotle employs to ranking
human lives.
One important clarification to make at this point regarding the lives of the
philosopher and the politician as candidates for eudaimonia is to question what Aristotle
would have to say about the ordinary citizens in his time. Are they all unable to be
eudaimones unless they become politicians or philosophers? I read Aristotle as implicitly
referring to ordinary citizens in his claim that eudaimonia is something available through
learning or practice to anyone138 who is not handicapped with respect to excellent
activity.139 Here I take Aristotle to be saying that anyone who can lead a life of excellent
activity, whether this includes the opportunities for theōria or not, will be happy to a degree
so long as that life includes activity in accordance with the excellences.
A private citizen’s life that does not include participation in the political process, but
rather interaction with friends and family, dealing with others well, and possessing the
proper temperament, demonstrates that much of the ethical virtues can be exercised even
by private citizens in their daily affairs. Kraut interprets Aristotle’s claim that eudaimonia is
something “available to many”140 passage to be saying that “the male citizens of Greek cities
138 Any male Greek citizen, that is.
139 EN I.10 1099b18-20.
140 EN I.9 1099b18.
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have enough moral excellence to share in political decision making.”141 While it may be true
that some of the citizens did take part in political proceedings, it is uncontroversial to
imagine some citizens who did not take part in political proceedings but still engaged in
some of activities which are in accordance with the practical excellences that are not
political in nature.
There are many opportunities in a Greek citizen’s life for the exercise of ethical
virtue which are not political in nature. Aristotle also notes that “private individuals seem to
perform decent actions no less, or even more, than those with political power.”142 These
decent actions are clearly not necessarily political, and Aristotle notes that a person will be
happy if he is active in accordance with excellence.143 So the private citizen may be
eudaimon to a degree as well, and Aristotle does not explicitly qualify the eudaimonia of the
private citizen in any way as promoting the philosopher’s good theōria.144
Kraut makes one final claim about theōria as the ultimate end of the life of a
philosopher. He claims that “all other ends in that life are desired for its sake.”145 This for-
the-sake-of relation recalls Aristotle’s discussion of subordinate ends in EN Book I, where he
argues that if X is chosen for the sake of Y, it follows that X is less desirable than Y. As
bridle-making is chosen for the sake of horsemanship, the former is less desirable than the
latter, having been chosen for its sake.146 If Kraut is right in his claim about theōria, then in
the philosopher’s life all of the other ends in that life must be subordinate to, and thus
chosen for the sake of, reflective activity.147 Amongst the set of things chosen for the sake
of reflective activity will be the ethically excellent activities. It is this claim about theōria,
that is nowhere explicitly supported by Aristotle, that is open to interpretive controversy.
141 Kraut, 1989. Pg. 110, fn. 44.
142 EN X.8 1179a5-6.
143 EN X.8 1179a9.
144 Whether or not the private citizen can be characterized as acting at times for the sake of the philosopher’s
good theoria will be examined below, when the “for the sake of” relation is turned to.
145 Kraut, 1989. P. 25.
146 EN I.1 1094a15-17.
147 This follows only if X’s being chosen for the sake of Y is the only way for X to be subordinate to Y. I choose
to leave aside different notions of subordination in Aristotle during this dissertation: the topic deserves its own
treatment.
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Before turning to Kraut’s hierarchy of goods in the philosopher’s life, it is important to note
that Kraut does not argue that ethically virtuous activity is chosen by non-philosophers only
for the sake of reflective activity. He interprets Aristotle as saying that ethically virtuous
activity is valuable for its own sake, being constitutive of the second best life humans can
engage in: the life of the politician. He also, however, says that ethical activity is valuable
because it promotes reflective activity, and in this way it is subordinate to reflective activity







M, N: Other goods that are desirable in themselves (e.g. honour)
X, Y, Z: Other goods that are conditionally desirable (e.g. wealth)148
On Kraut’s view, each good that is on a lower row is instrumental to goods which are higher
up on the tree.149 Since ethical activity is lower on the tree than reflective activity, this
means that it is both inferior and subordinate to reflective activity: “All goods are to be
located in a hierarchy constructed out of the for-the-sake-of relation, and since theoretical
activity alone is desirable for the sake of nothing further, the ethical virtues must be
desirable in part because they promote the philosophical life.”150 Kraut is here describing
the role of the ethical virtues in the philosopher’s life. It must be understood that in the life
of the philosopher, the ethical virtues take on a purely instrumental role according to Kraut:
“In the philosophical life, one’s ultimate aim is the exercise of theoretical wisdom, and one
is best off if one exercises other virtues to the extent that they contribute to this highest
goal.”151 In other words, the ethical virtues are chosen for the sake of their contribution to
excellent theōria. It is in the life of the politician that the ethical virtues are chosen both for
their own sake, and for the sake of promoting good theōria in philosophers, such as in the
148 The diagram is taken from Kraut, 1989, p.6.
149 The role that goods in the bottom two rows play in the life of a eudaimon will be turned to in II.III on a
complete life.
150 Kraut, 1989 p. 179.
151 Kraut, 1989 p. 343, emphasis mine.
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case of a politician who sets up universities where such contemplative activity can flourish. I
now turn to Kraut’s account of how ethical virtues promote the philosophical life.
Since bridle-making is chosen for the sake of horsemanship, it is the expert rider that
provides the standard for how the bridle should be made: the bridle-maker serves the
expert rider.152 The rider also provides the reason for which the bridle is made: without the
need or desire to ride horses we would not need bridles. Bridle-making is undertaken solely
for the sake of riding horses.153 This is similar to, but not exactly how, Kraut characterizes
the relationship between the practical and the theoretical virtues in the life of the
philosopher. Kraut characterizes the for-the-sake-of relation as, at least in part, a causal
one. The substantive difference in the relationship between bridle-making and riders, when
compared to the relationship between the ethical and theoretical virtues, is that in the
former the bridles are valued solely for the sake of riding a horse. On Kraut’s view, the
ethical virtues are valued both for their own sake and for the sake of promoting reflective
activity in the philosopher’s life. Even if we could not engage in the reflective activity of the
gods, we would still choose the ethical virtues, for they are what allow us to be well-
functioning, that is good, human beings. The philosopher will want to possess the
excellences, for he could not be a philosopher if he did not have, for example, temperance.
If a philosopher is too concerned with physical pleasures and would rather cook and eat
lavish dinners154 than study, he will find himself unable to properly engage in philosophy.
Similarly, if the philosopher does not have enough concern for eating and drinking, this
person will become malnourished.155 Kraut’s argument here characterizes the ethically
deficient person as someone who would be unable to engage properly in reflective activity.
It should be noted that being a philosopher is one way, according to Aristotle, of being a
well-functioning human. The central difficulty I have with Kraut’s position is his
characterisation of a eudaimon philosopher’s decision to act in accordance with the ethical
virtues.
152 Kraut, 1989 p. 201.
153 It is possible that the bridle-maker also values bridle-making for its own sake. Whether or not bridles are
only instrumentally valuable does not change the characterization of Kraut’s interpretation of the link between
the practical and theoretical virtues in Aristotle’s EN.
154 Characterizing Aristotle’s reference to “those who enjoy smells of perfumes or tasty dishes” at EN III.10
1118a13.
155 Kraut, 1989, p. 179-180.
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The causal relationship Kraut argues for between the practical and theoretical
virtues is one which is meant to support the notion that since the practical virtues appear to
be necessary prerequisites for engaging in reflective activity, then they must be chosen for
its sake. However, this does not appear to be what Aristotle is saying when he refers to the
excellences. The person who lacks temperance is a person who fails to lead either the life of
a politician or a philosopher. In the life of the philosopher it is true that one cannot be a
philosopher without a well-developed character, but it does not follow from this that one
chooses to cultivate, or act in accordance with the rest of excellence (the excellences aside
from reflective activity) only for-the-sake-of promoting more reflective activity. If someone
is not temperate, he will be distracted by physical pleasures which will undermine his
eudaimonia per se. He has not developed himself in such a way that he can control himself,
and Aristotle’s inquiry is useless for those who lack self-control.156 The lack of practical
virtue does not just undermine the attempt at a philosophical life: it undermines
eudaimonia entirely, political or philosophical. Showing that practical virtues are necessary
in order to lead the life of the philosopher does not show that the philosopher chooses the
practical virtues for the sake of excellent theōria. Any eudaimon will need to exercise the
practical virtues in order to be a good person.
If philosophers do not choose ethically excellent activity solely for the sake of
excellent theōria, as Kraut argues, an interpretation of why the philosopher chooses
ethically excellent activity at all must be provided. On my reading, the ethically excellent
activities are necessary prerequisites for every private, political, or philosophical eudaimon.
The private citizen chooses to act in accordance with practical excellences because this is
how, as was mentioned earlier, he interacts well with other human beings. The politician
chooses excellent practical activities for their own sake, as pursuing and maintaining the
good of a city is both fine and godlike.157 But when Aristotle says that the politician’s
activity “aims beyond the business of politics itself—at getting power, or honours, or indeed
happiness for himself and his fellow citizens, this being distinct from the exercise of political
expertise, and something we clearly do seek as something distinct”158 in Book X, it might be
156 EN I.3 1095a9-10.
157 I am wary about using ‘fine’ here, as I do not have the space to go into a good discussion about what “for
the sake of the fine” means. EN I.2 1094b9-11.
158 EN X.7 1177b13-16.
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thought that here Aristotle is contradicting what he said earlier, and now that political
activity is chosen both for its own sake and for the sake of what it produces.
Yet the virtues are chosen for themselves;159 and the practical excellences can be
used actively to produce something beyond the mere engagement in the activities
themselves. The life of a politician contains many opportunities for exercising the practical
excellences, but the life of a politician also carries with it constraints of role: all of the
responsibilities which the politicians engage in for particular goals, say attending this
meeting to pass that law, becomes part of the daily life of the politician. That political
activities aim at producing something beyond the activities itself does not undermine
Aristotle’s claim that the practically excellent activities are chosen for their own sake. A
good man chooses to enter into politics for one kind of reason: that political activity is one
of the best ways to be a well-functioning human being. He carries out the tasks associated
with becoming a politician for another reason: for the sake of continuing in his job as a
politician, for example.
The life of the philosopher, however, is characterized by good theōria. When an
opportunity for ethical activity presents itself to the philosopher, is the philosopher annoyed
by this distraction from his work? After all, good reflective activity shares an affinity with
the activity of the gods, and these human concerns for justice and courage could plausibly
require a philosopher who may otherwise reflect unimpeded, to take the time to interact
with his fellow citizens. The way Aristotle describes mankind throughout the EN suggests
that he saw men as anything but philosophical hermits. When Aristotle describes his notion
of (S) in EN I.7 he notes that the complete good for a human will be (S), and not just for him,
but rather “for one’s parents, children, wife, and generally those one loves, and one’s fellow
citizens, since man is by nature a civic being.”160 The emphasis here is on human interaction
per se, from one’s friends161 and loved ones to other people in the city, such as one’s
neighbours. If a philosopher is researching at home and hears a disturbance at his friend’s
159 EN X.6 1176b7-8.
160 EN I.7 1097b9-11.
161 Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in EN Books XIII and IX have themselves spawned a vast literature. For
the sake of this example I will use Aristotle’s notion of excellent friends, which is friendship between people
who are close to each other in terms of their excellence. X being excellent friends with Y requires that both
are good people, and they wish good things for their friends; for the sake of their friends (EN VIII.3 1156b7-12).
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house next door, should he ignore that occurrence and continue with his contemplating?162
Nothing in the EN suggests that Aristotle would give such primacy to contemplation; a
primacy where one should choose reflective activity over an opportunity for the exercise of
the practical virtues. In fact the philosopher, as a human being who lives with other people
“chooses to do the deeds that accord with excellence”163 where ‘excellence’ here clearly
refers to ethically excellent activities, for the philosopher already engages in reflective
activity; in this passage Aristotle is describing his choosing to engage in activities that are in
accordance with the rest of excellence.
The philosopher, even though he engages in a divine-like reflective activity, is still a
human being. And insofar as he is a human being, he will be presented with opportunities
to act well in a practical way. His doing well in these circumstances cannot plausibly be
characterized as a mere means to an end: returning to his research. Characterizing practical
excellent activities in this way puts an insufficient stress on how Aristotle envisions humans,
as interacting amongst each other. If a philosopher takes the time to help his neighbour
because he wants to get back to philosophizing, he will be treating at least some of the
excellences as a means to help him return to his researching. Characterizing the ethical
virtues in a philosopher’s life as instrumental puts far too much of an intellectual strain on
Aristotle’s account of what the philosophers are: in essence, human beings who are
fortunate enough to have the means to engage in this divine like contemplation; but human
beings, nevertheless.
Considering again the example of the philosopher who hears a disturbance at his
friend’s house, what would the philosopher do? On my reading, he would go to help his
friend, because the good person on Aristotle’s account “does many things for the sake of
friends and fatherland, even dying for it if need be…”164 because this is what a eudaimon
162 This example may have a number of answers which depend on the type of disturbance. Imagine, in this
scenario, that the philosopher’s neighbour is a very good friend who is normally quiet and calm. He hears his
friend crying out for help, mid-philosophical sentence.
163 EN X.8 1178b6-7.
164 EN IX.8 1169a21-22. This quote in isolation may be seen as an argument against egoism, but that is not the
point of this quote here. I quote this passage to show that in Aristotle there exist other regarding
considerations, sometimes very strong ones (in the case of a soldier defending his state against an invasion),
and these are amongst human beings. The role of human interaction in Aristotle’s account must be
emphasized in order to argue against the intellectualization of the ethical virtues as means to good reflective
activity.
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does when confronted with situations wherein the practical excellences may be exercised.
Philosophers are human beings, too, and it is human nature to “live with others”165
according to Aristotle.
I have tried to show that the ethically excellent activity makes an independent
contribution to one’s eudaimonia. Both the private citizen and the politician are capable of
achieving eudaimonia according to Aristotle, even though this eudaimonia will not be of as
high a grade as that of the philosopher. But the philosopher’s eudaimonia does not consist
entirely in good theōria, as a human being he will have the opportunity to act in accordance
with all of excellence, not just his intelligence by himself as a hermit. So, when Aristotle
refers to the human good as activity in accordance with the best and most complete
excellence in EN I.7, he is allowing that there be a highest form of eudaimonia; but that
there is a best and most complete excellence does not remove the other excellences from
their eudaimonia-constituting status. Even the philosopher, who engages in the best
activity that human beings can engage in, will exercise the practical virtues in his dealings
with other human beings because this is what a good human being does, whether or not
this will contribute to his good theōria at some point in the future.
The discussion about eudaimonia so far has been confined to the role that the
ethical virtues play in a eudaimon life. Acting in accordance with the excellences is the good
of human beings, but this is only the case in a complete life. I now turn to what Aristotle
means when he qualifies an active life in accordance with the excellences with this phrase.
II.III In a Complete Life
One way to read Aristotle’s “in a complete life”166 is simply as a reference to time.167
The sentence which follows CL reads “For a single swallow does not make spring, nor does a
single day; in the same way, neither does a single day, or a short time, make a man blessed
and happy.”168 Aristotle’s definition of (C) occurs just before he turns to the question of
what the human good consists in via the FA in EN I.7, and (C) requires that the human good,
165 EN IX.9 1169b19.
166 I will use ‘CL’ to denote ‘in a complete life’, to prevent awkward phrasing and repetition.
167 Brown, 2006. Pg. 3.
168 EN I.7 1098a19-21.
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eudaimonia, be the most desirable of all things.169 If Aristotle were solely referring to time
at CL, a complete life would be understood as nothing over and above a long life of excellent
activity. This interpretation is strange, in that Aristotle would be understood as having
introduced the notion of eudaimonia being complete, and then when positing CL at the end
of an argument which is meant to explain what the human good is, ‘complete’ in CL would
refer to nothing over and above a temporal emphasis. Having just defined (C), it is not
plausible that the use of “complete” in CL would there be used so narrowly. In Aristotle’s
time dying before one’s prime was quite common, and so CL would refer to at least time
because deaths of this sort were a common way for a person, otherwise perfectly qualified
for eudaimonia, to fail in becoming eudaimon.
There are a number of interpretations of Aristotle which put forward that
eudaimonia “just is virtuous activity”,170 and it will be argued in this section that Aristotle’s
notion of a complete life includes more than excellent activity in a long life. When Aristotle
mentions CL, he is referring both to the length of a life and to the role of other goods in the
eudaimon’s life. The following will argue that, though excellent activity is a necessary
prerequisite for eudaimonia, it is not sufficient for eudaimonia.171 Views which hold that
virtuous activity is sufficient for eudaimonia give insufficient weight to the passages that
Aristotle uses to describe the eudaimon as a human being; someone whose life is in
accordance with complete excellence and also a civic life.
It will be useful to divide the interpretations regarding the role of external goods in a
eudaimon’s life into two groups:
i) Dominant View (DV): Eudaimonia consists in one supremely valuable component:
virtuous activity. One’s eudaimonia is understood as nothing over and above the
169 EN I.7 1097b16.
170 Brown, 2006, page 4: “Once one realizes that [eudaimonia] just is virtuous activity…” & Kraut, 1989, pg 278-
9 claims that “…eudaimonia increases or diminishes only to the extent that the level of our virtuous activity is
raised or lowered.” & Crisp, 1994, page 119: “eudaimonia…is not improvable, since excellent activities
themselves include or involve all intrinsic goods.” These are examples of the view which interprets eudaimonia
as nothing over and above virtuous activity itself, whether or not that activity includes the intrinsic goods as in
Crisp’s case.
171 Though one who acts in accordance with complete excellence may not be eudaimon, he will never be
miserable, a state Aristotle saves for the wretched: “…the [eudaimon] will never become miserable, though
neither will he be blessed if he meets with fortunes like Priam’s” (EN I.10 1101a6-8).
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virtuous activity contained in the life. More virtuous in a life means that this life is
more eudaimon.172
ii) Inclusivist View (IV): Eudaimonia consists in a number of ends that are roughly equal,
that is, no end is incommensurably more valuable than any other end. One’s
eudaimonia can be affected by events in that life, and not simply because these
events cause changes in the amount of virtuous activity done in the life. The
amount of virtuous activity contained in a life is not the only variable used in
understanding one’s eudaimonia, though it is the most important.173
An adherent of IV need not think that the only role external goods play in a eudaimon life is
one of providing an independent contribution to one’s eudaimonia; that is, that they are all
intrinsically valuable. There are two roles that external goods have according to Aristotle.
On one hand, external goods are used as tools by the eudaimon. Good fortune is used by
the eudaimon in a fine and worthwhile manner,174 the eudaimon accomplishes things
through having friends, political power or wealth: these being of instrumental use to the
eudaimon. Of the goods available to the eudaimon, some “contribute to it by being useful
tools.”175 On the other hand, external goods also have the role of making a contribution to
one’s eudaimonia without directly promoting the eudaimon’s excellent activity. Some goods
are “necessary to happiness”176 and act in a eudaimon life “such as to add lustre to [the]
life.”177 The claims that Aristotle makes regarding external goods in these passages suggests
that he thought external goods can be useful to the eudaimon in a purely instrumental
fashion, so as to promote more virtuous activity, or as independent intrinsic goods such as
pleasure, which make the eudaimon’s life good, that is, better than it would be without
pleasure.
Kraut argues against the possibility of there being any intrinsically valuable external
goods in a eudaimon life by looking at the way such goods are treated in EN I.5.178 There,
Kraut argues, Aristotle is seeking a single good with which to identify happiness, and he
172 Kraut, 1989, pg 278. I will focus on Kraut’s DV for the remainder of this chapter.
173 Ackrill, 1980. P. 341.
174 EN I.10 1100b27-28.
175 EN I.9 1099b28-29.
176 EN I.9 1099b28.
177 EN I.10 1099b27-28.
178 Kraut, 1989. Pp. 225-7.
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rejects the lives which have pleasure, wealth or virtue as their single end. On Kraut’s view, if
Aristotle had IV in mind when he was examining the candidates for the end of the eudaimon
life, he would not need to examine any single good such as pleasure or wealth
independently: Aristotle could do away with any single-end view of the good with the same
argument, that is, that since there are multiple goods which are intrinsically valuable, any
single-good conception of the good will fail. Aristotle does not do this, on Kraut’s view,
because he is looking for a single end at the top of the for-the-sake-of relation (the top of
the tree), and with respect to this single end all other goods will be subordinated on Kraut’s
view. The difference between IV and DV is one in which Aristotle’s for-the-sake-of relation is
understood differently.








M, N: Other goods that are desirable in themselves (e.g. honour)
X, Y, Z: Other goods that are conditionally desirable (e.g. wealth)179
Every good on the tree, below A, is chosen for-the-sake-of A, except B, M and N which are
desirable both for their own sake and for the sake of A. On Kraut’s view “when one thing is
desired or desirable for the sake of a second, there must be something about the second
that helps us understand why wanting the first is appropriate.”180 Since on Kraut’s view, the
parts on the tree bear a causal relationship which aims towards A, that is they can be
understood as directly promoting or in the pursuit of A, the for-the-sake-of relationship
works because each part can be understood as promoting the ultimate end, good theōria.
The relationship between all the goods on the tree that are lower than A, and A itself, is one
in which the lower goods are chosen, at least in part, because they promote good theōria.
179 The diagram is taken from Kraut, 1989, p.6.
180 Kraut, 1989. P. 212.
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Kraut finds the for-the-sake-of relations in IV to be “mysterious.”181 He is here
referring to Ackrill’s interpretation of Aristotle’s for-the-sake-of relation. The passage which
is central to understanding Aristotle’s for-the-sake-of relation is the following:
“It makes no difference—as in the case of the sorts of knowledge mentioned—whether
the ends of the actions are the activities themselves, or some other thing over and
above these.”182
On Ackrill’s view, this passage is best understood as one where Aristotle is mentioning two
sorts of subordination. The first sort of subordination is one wherein the subordinate
activity produces a product which the superior activity uses. For example, a eudaimon needs
a certain level of wealth in order to be magnanimous.183 This is the type of subordination
that Kraut envisions all goods lower than A, on his tree, to partake in. Ackrill however
interprets ‘whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves’ as referring to a
case where the subordinate activity “has no such end apart from itself but is its own end.”184
He provides an example of part-to-whole regarding golf and having a good holiday:
One does not putt in order to play golf as one buys a club in order to play golf; and this
distinction matches that between activities that do not and those that do produce a
product. It will be ‘because you wanted to play golf that you are putting, and ‘for the
sake’ of a good holiday that you are playing golf; but this is because putting and golfing
are constituents of or ingredients in golfing and having a good holiday respectively, not
because they are necessary preliminaries. Putting is playing golf (though not all that
playing golf is), and golfing (in a somewhat different way) is having a good holiday
(though not all that having a good holiday is).
On Ackrill’s view there are two ways in which to understand Aristotle’s for-the-sake-of
relation. Some goods will be for-the-sake-of virtuous activity precisely in the way in which
Kraut understands the relation, and some goods will be valued for their own sake, as
constituents of eudaimonia. Yet what an adherent of IV must do at this point is to find a
good (or goods) which on Aristotle’s view would be chosen not because they contribute to
excellent activity, but rather to eudaimonia, being independent contributors to eudaimonia.
The most powerful passage which supports this view is the following, where Aristotle has
just referred to the class of goods which are purely instrumental to eudaimonia:
181 Ibid. p. 212.
182 EN I.I 1094a16-7.
183 Aristotle discusses open-handedness in EN IV.1.
184 Ackrill, 1980, p. 342-343.
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…then again, there are some things the lack of which is like a stain on [eudaimonia],
things like good birth, being blessed in one’s children, beauty: for the person who is
extremely ugly, or of low birth, or on his own without children is someone we would be
not altogether inclined to call happy, and even less inclined, presumably, if someone had
totally depraved children or friends, or ones who were good but dead.185
Clearly Aristotle is not referring to these goods in an instrumental fashion, as he has just
finished referring to such goods. He has turned to consider the second role of external
goods as necessary goods in a eudaimon life and is, on my reading, stating what he thought
was obvious. This is why the point is not repeated over and over again in later sections of
the EN, for he is stating what he thinks anyone who is not insensitive to suffering would feel.
If my children grow up to be wretched junkies, on Kraut’s view the only way in which my
eudaimonia is affected by this occurrence would be that having children like this would
diminish my virtuous activity. This could be characterized as my spending hours worrying
about their current physical state as opposed to continuing with my philosophizing or
exercising any of the practical virtues.
However, Aristotle himself discusses this possibility when he says that bad fortunes
“bring on pains, and obstruct many sorts of activities.”186 I read Aristotle as referring to two
sorts of misfortunes here. One type brings on a pain so great that eudaimonia is simply not
possible for some time, such as in a tragic death. The other may be physical impairment, or
the loss of financial resources: faculties which enable a eudaimon to accomplish virtuous
activities. In this passage Aristotle provides a consideration of what may happen in a
eudaimon life. Aristotle thinks that even in tragic circumstances the good person will “bear
repeated and great misfortunes calmly, not because he is insensitive to them…”187 The
eudaimon is someone who acts according to the excellences, but he also has the appropriate
emotional response to tragic situations. This emotional response is to “bear what fortune
brings him with good grace”188 but to act gracefully in the face of strokes of fortune or
misfortune does not commit Aristotle to claiming that the eudaimon is not a feeling human
being. The deprivation of certain goods can thus be characterized as being an emotional
blow to that of the eudaimon. Imagine a eudaimon politician who hears during his busy day
185 EN I.8 1099b2-7.
186 EN I.10 1099b29-30.
187 EN I.10 1100b32.
188 EN I.10 1100a1-2.
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that one of his good friends was killed in a battle. The immediate emotional response is one
of sorrow, even for the eudaimon. Can he be characterized as quitting his job, or perhaps
taking time off from work in order to mourn his son? It is appropriate to have the right
measure of practical rationality and emotional maturity, and it is this mix that Aristotle
admits, and Kraut recognizes,189 to be one which admits of imprecision.
II.IV Conclusion
The first two chapters of this dissertation represent my attempt to explicate what
Aristotle’s eudaimonia consists in. I have argued that Aristotle’s eudaimonia consists of
more than virtuous activity, and characterized multiple eudaimon lives ranging from that of
the private citizen to Aristotle’s ideal eudaimon, the philosopher. Yet even in the
philosopher’s life, more than virtuous activity is needed for eudaimonia. It has been
important to interpret Aristotle’s eudaimonia for the following two chapters will first
attempt to characterize eudaimonia as a sense of our conception of ‘happiness’, and then to
defend eudaimonia as a plausible theory of well-being.
189 Kraut, 1989. Pg. 30, fn. 16.
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Chapter III: The ‘Happiness’ of Aristotle’s Eudaimon
III.I Introduction
In previous chapters, the term ‘eudaimonia’ was used instead of rendering it into
English expressions such as ‘happiness’190 or ‘flourishing’191 in order to treat the concept of
eudaimonia independently from problems which arise in its translation. Translations of
Aristotle’s EN often use ‘happiness’ as the English correlate of ‘eudaimonia’, which gives rise
to the question as to whether or not, and if so in what sense, Aristotle’s eudaimon is a
happy person. Aristotle’s eudaimonia is what he argues to be the highest good for human
beings and the previous chapters have provided an account of what the concept of
eudaimonia consists of. This chapter examines the eudaimon himself. Is the eudaimon
happy or flourishing as we might understand the terms today? Or rather, does Aristotle
have a notion in mind that there is no English word for? If the eudaimon can be
characterized as a happy person, Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia need not be one
which is merely theoretical: its content may guide us in understanding what the happy life
for humans, even now, is. Aristotle’s inquiry into philosophical ethics is practical: it is meant
to result in an answer which can help us live better lives, for “…the end is not knowing
things but doing them.”192
Yet an immediate problem arises with respect to the term ‘happiness’. The usage of
the term threatens to undermine philosophical inquiry before it gets under way: dogs are
said to be happy when they play, as are children whilst eating ice cream. The term
according to Cooper “tends to be taken as referring exclusively to a subjective psychological
state, and indeed one that is often temporary and recurrent.”193 By ‘subjective’ Cooper
means that whatever it is that makes me happy is what my happiness consists of: as long as I
take myself to be happy, then I am happy. On this view, all that ‘happiness’ refers to is the
psychological state that “happy people” share: the pleasant sensation which accompanies
190 Rowe, 2002.
191 Cooper, 1975.
192 EN I.3 1095a5-6. Emphasis mine.
193 Cooper, 1975. P. 89. I agree with Cooper that the term tends to be understood this way, at least in English,
but I shall argue that this is not the only way to understand ‘happiness’.
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the belief that my important desires are being met. So the fulfilment of the desire of a dog
to bury his bone in the backyard produces what we refer to as a ‘happy dog’: he buries the
bone and wags his tail. Similarly, when we refer to a ‘happy man’ we could refer simply to
the fact that his desires are being met,194 whatever they are.
If Cooper is right about what ‘happiness’ refers to, it is clear that Aristotle’s
eudaimonia should not be translated in this way. If ‘happiness’ refers to nothing over and
above a subjective psychological state, then eudaimonia has very little to do with
‘happiness’, for eudaimonia is not a mental state: it constitutes what the good life for
human beings is according to Aristotle. Richard Kraut notes that “Aristotle never uses
eudaimonia in this way,”195 that is, to call someone eudaimon simply because he feels that
way about his life. Yet the question remains as to whether or not the eudaimon differs from
those we consider to be in a happy frame of mind.
Richard Kraut takes up the question of whether or not the eudaimon is a happy
person and argues that the eudaimon is in fact happy.196 Kraut characterizes the eudaimon
as a person who is in the very same psychological state as a happy person because the
eudaimon “is very glad to be alive; he judges that on balance his deepest desires are being
satisfied and that the circumstances of his life are turning out well.”197 Kraut recognizes a
meaning of ‘happiness’ which differs from Cooper’s198, in that more than just the
psychological state is required: Kraut understands one’s happiness as residing in the
judgement that he is meeting the standards he imposes on his life.199 He argues, however,
194 Or at least that he believes his desires are being met.
195 Kraut, 1979. P. 180.
196 Kraut, 1979.
197 Kraut, 1979. P. 170.
198 Kraut also recognises a meaning of happiness as Cooper understands but argues that it is a half-truth. On
Kraut’s view, if P were utterly deceived about the circumstances by which he understands himself to be happy,
he is happy but we are reluctant to say that he is leading a happy life, for to conclude that P is leading a happy
life would be to imply that P “attaches some significant value to the situation in which he is deceived.” (Kraut,
1979. P. 180).
199 Kraut, 1979. P. 180.
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that as a conception of happiness eudaimonia ought to be rejected, for the standard which
needs to be met in order to be eudaimon is too stringent.200
Kraut characterizes eudaimonia as an objective conception of happiness. An
objective conception of happiness according to Kraut is one in which “people should not be
considered happy unless they are coming reasonably close to living the best life they are
capable of.”201 An objective conception of happiness provides an ideal standard, and it is in
meeting this and only this standard that happiness is understood. A conception of
happiness being objective and not subjective is not sufficient for it to be stringent.202 It is
the content of Aristotle’s objective conception of happiness that represents what he
believed to be the ideal life for human beings. The ideal life is what any objectivist theory
argues for, and Aristotle’s EN is an example of such a theory: the complete life of excellent
activity is what the best life consists of, thus far referred to as eudaimonia.
Any objectivist conception of happiness is considered stringent by Kraut in part
because it is not up to you to determine the standard you must meet to be happy. Even if
someone meets the standard that he sets for his life, if he does not fulfil the requirements
of the objectivist theory, he will not be and should not be considered a happy person. Kraut
interprets eudaimonia as a conception of happiness where the standard for happiness “is
fixed by your nature, and your job is to discover it.”203 Kraut is here referring to Aristotle’s
FA and interpreting the ideal eudaimon life to be that of the philosopher.204 There are two
conceptions of happiness on Kraut’s view. One is subjective and available to anyone who is
satisfying his desires or wants. The other is objective and exemplified by Aristotle’s
eudaimonia, where happiness is only available to those who fulfil the relevant criteria of the
eudaimon standard.
200 ‘Stringent’ is Kraut’s general objection to eudaimonia as a conception of happiness. The objections are
characterized in more detail below.
201 Kraut, 1979. P. 180-1.
202 Consider an objective conception of happiness that consists of one single criterion, breathing. Almost any
living person meets this standard, so it is not properly characterized as stringent. Yet, it is objective in that one
must breathe in order to be understood as, and rightly feel happy.
203 Kraut, 1979. P. 181. By ‘your nature’ Kraut is referring to ‘your nature as a human being’, and thus
identifying the fulfilment of the human function with what Aristotle’s eudaimonia as a conception of happiness
requires.
204 See Chapters One and Two.
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On Kraut’s view, if eudaimonia were to be used as the standard for understanding
happiness many people would not be considered happy, including villains and children,
because they have not developed themselves to lead active lives in accordance with
complete excellence. Kraut’s objections to using eudaimonia as the conception of happiness
can be understood in two ways:
i) (IH) Eudaimonia is an inhumane conception of happiness: If someone is permanently
handicapped, he cannot attain eudaimonia. Therefore handicapped people should
not be satisfied with their lives as they do not live up to the eudaimon standard,205
and should neither be, nor deemed, happy.206 Eudaimonia does not take into
account one’s limitations: it represents the ideal standard for any human being.207
On Kraut’s view, the objectivist who holds eudaimonia to be the correct
conception of happiness will see a large gap between the life a handicapped
person leads and the life of the philosopher, and this objectivist will be committed
to telling the handicapped person, even in the case where he is doing the best he
can, that he should be unhappy208 with his life given how distant it is from the ideal
of eudaimonia.209 Eudaimonia as a conception of happiness is inhumane according
to Kraut because it does not take one’s capabilities into account: no circumstance
changes the eudaimon standard, such that if you cannot reach eudaimonia, even
through no fault of your own, you cannot be happy.
ii) (NH) Eudaimonia is too narrow a conception of happiness: According to Kraut, in the
EN there is one best life proposed: that of the philosopher.210 There are two ways
in which Kraut believes eudaimonia as a conception of happiness is too narrow.
205 According to Kraut, this follows because he interprets Aristotle to be saying one is called eudaimon only “if
that person comes fairly close to the ideal life for all human beings.” Kraut interprets Aristotle as providing
one ideal life--that of the philosopher— and that eudaimonia can only be achieved by coming reasonably close
to this ideal. Kraut, 1979. P. 196.
206 There are two points that Kraut is making with these objections: i) That ‘happiness’ is not a good translation
of eudaimonia, and ii) even though the eudaimon can be understood as happy, eudaimonia should be rejected
as a conception of happiness because of IH and NH. Kraut, 1979. P. 194.
207 Kraut, 1979. P. 182.
208 The phrase “unhappy with his life” suggests that the person in question is miserable. I will pursue this
implication in further detail in III.II.I where I argue that not being eudaimon does not entail one is miserable,
for Aristotle himself says that a miserable existence is reserved for those who “do what is hateful and vile” (EN
I.X 1100b35).
209 Kraut uses ‘inhumane’ in this context, regarding an objectivist who “would persuade him (a handicapped
person) to be unhappy with his life.” Kraut, 1979. P. 183-4 & 194. He thinks that the eudaimon, valuing
Aristotle’s standard for the good life as he does, will not think a handicapped person is right in feeling happy
with his situation in life because he is so incapable (Kraut thinks), of being eudaimon.
210 “The Nicomachean Ethics argues that there is just one life that is best for everyone—the philosophical life—
but objectivists can disagree” (Kraut, 1979. P. 181). Kraut later claims that the best life being that of the
philosopher “seems much too narrow, so let us leave this aside and consider Aristotle’s claim that the best life
must make an excellent use of reason” (Kraut, 1979. P. 191). Kraut argues that even this broader
interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia is too narrow.
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The first is with respect to the excellent use of reason. Kraut argues that someone
might make poor use of his reasoning abilities but, using his other talents and
abilities, still come reasonably close to the ideal life for him.211 So eudaimonia is
too narrow in the sense that it is only through excellent reasoning that one can be
happy. Secondly, Kraut argues that Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia calls for
temperance with respect to physical pleasures, and courage on the battlefield
amongst other things. Kraut argues that there “is no reason to believe that a
person fully realizes his capacities only if he adopts Aristotle’s attitudes towards
physical pleasure and the use of force.”212 Kraut sees eudaimonia as a narrow
conception of happiness because it is through being virtuous as Aristotle
understands the virtues that happiness is achieved. 213
If eudaimonia is understood as the definition for what it is to be a happy person,
then eudaimonia is the standard that must be reached by every person in order to be
happy. Aristotle’s understanding of the function of human beings is what supports his
conception of eudaimonia. The Aristotelian eudaimon lives, on Kraut’s view, according to a
fixed, narrow standard. On Kraut’s view eudaimonia requires one to be living a life which is
as close as possible to Aristotle’s conception of the ideal life, if we were to judge happiness
using eudaimonia as the standard we would not be able to judge many of the people we
now consider happy as actually being happy.214 Children, for example, would not be
understood as happy, for they are only referred to as eudaimon on Aristotle’s view with
respect to their good prospects in the future.215 Since Kraut believes that there is a sharp
disagreement between the standard we use to evaluate whether or not a person is happy
and Aristotle’s standard, that we should reject eudaimonia as a conception of happiness.216
It is the substance of the disagreement that Kraut finds problematic: he characterizes
eudaimonia as a stringent standard that many people are excluded from for a number of
reasons. On Kraut’s view, if we were to use Aristotle’s eudaimon standard to understand
211 Kraut, 1979. P. 191. Kraut argues that Aristotle “does not give any convincing reason for believing that this
cannot happen.” Kraut does not himself provide an example where this is realistically possible. I try to
develop such an example in (III.III)
212 Kraut, 1979. P. 191.
213 This objection can be understood as questioning the link between virtuous activities per se and happiness,
or as questioning Aristotle’s definition of what virtuous activities are. I explore both options in III.II.II.
214 I use ‘we’ here to refer to Kraut’s understanding of the modern usage of the term ‘happiness’ or its
cognates (Kraut, 1979. P. 167). I will argue later in III.II that it is not clear that some of the people Kraut takes
to be happy are happy in a substantive sense (any sense over and above H1).
215 EN I.9 1100a3-4.
216 Kraut, 1979. P. 167.
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whether or not we are leading happy lives, then we would have to radically change the way
we live if we wanted to be happy. If we adopted Aristotle’s eudaimonia as our conception
of happiness, many of us would become discontented where we are now contented with
our lives, because on Kraut’s view many of the people we now consider happy are not
eudaimones. These people would cease to believe they are happy, and need to “make
radical changes in [their] lives” in order to become eudaimones.217
Kraut sees eudaimonia as a standard for happiness, but one which is very different
from our modern standard as shown by his NH and IH objections. It is because of NH and IH
that Kraut argues for the rejection of eudaimonia as the conception of happiness. With
these differences in mind, one might question an adherent of eudaimonia as Callicles did
Socrates:
Tell me, Socrates, are we to take you as being in earnest now, or joking? For if you are
in earnest, and these things you’re saying are really true, won’t this human life of ours be
turned upside down, and won’t everything we do evidently be the opposite of what we
should do?218
Kraut is posing the same sort of question to Aristotle that Callicles asked of Socrates, and
Kraut is arguing that there is no reason for us to adopt Aristotle’s conception of happiness
because eudaimonia is a standard which differs sharply from the way we understand
happiness today. If Kraut’s characterization of Aristotle’s eudaimonia is accurate, then NH
and IH show that the standard we use to understand happiness and the standard Aristotle
uses are almost entirely different: they are two separate conceptions of happiness.
However, IH and NH do not sit well with what Aristotle says about eudaimonia as
something “available to many; for it will be possible for it to belong, through some kind of
learning or practice, to anyone not handicapped in relation to excellence.”219 In section
III.II.I I will argue that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not inhumane as a conception of happiness
as Kraut believes, using the interpretation of eudaimonia that has been argued for in
Chapters One and Two. Eudaimonia is something which many people can obtain, though
217 Kraut, 1979. P. 184.
218 Plato. Complete Works. ‘Gorgias’ Trans: Donald J. Zeyl in Cooper, 1997. Hackett Publishing. 481b6-c4,
emphasis mine.
219 EN 1099b18-20.
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not in as widespread a fashion as ‘happiness’ is used today.220 In the cases where Kraut
argues that eudaimonia cannot be achieved due to case-specific limitations, I will argue that
there is a correspondence between those who Aristotle thinks cannot achieve eudaimonia
and those who we, even today, would be reluctant to say are leading happy lives. In section
III.II.II I will argue that eudaimonia is not NH as Kraut believes, because as eudaimonia has
been understood thus far, there are many other lives aside from the philosophical life (or
those which closely relate to this life) that Aristotle’s theory allows to be eudaimon as well,
though to a lesser degree.
Aristotle’s eudaimonia as a conception of happiness is similar to the way ‘happiness’
is thought of in certain contexts today. In philosophical literature, for example as a
translation of eudaimonia, ‘happiness’ is used in the sense of ‘well-being’. This sense of
happiness evaluates more than the presence or absence of the relevant mental states
associated with ‘being happy’.221 Aristotle’s eudaimon is happy to be leading his life, but
this happiness requires more than the psychological states that we attribute to happy
people. If this is correct, then understanding the eudaimon as a ‘happy person’ can be done
using a different sense of ‘happiness’ than the one which refers exclusively to the
psychological state.
From the previous chapters it should be clear that happy psychological states are not
sufficient for eudaimonia. However, whether or not the happy psychological state is
necessary for eudaimonia needs to be addressed. Can we characterize eudaimones as
smiley-faced persons? There are times when a eudaimon will be happy-minded and also
times when the eudaimon will not (e.g. facing a charge on the battlefield). It is not
necessary that being eudaimon requires a happy mental state which recurs frequently,
though the mental state plausibly occurs at times in the eudaimon life. In other words, one
can be eudaimon without being in a persistent, smiley-faced happy psychological state, even
if this psychological state occurs at times. Eudaimonia does not result from many
220 I am here referring to the two senses in which ‘happiness’ is used today, which I detail below.
221 Haybron, 2008. P. 34. Here Haybron divides theories of well-being into 5 different categories, all of which
are answering the question of what it means for a life to be going well on the whole. My point is that there is a
sense in which asking the question “Are you happy?” refers to more than the presence of the psychological
state. It can be seen as asking “On the whole, is your life going well?”
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occurrences of smiley-faced moments above a certain threshold over a lifetime. It results
from, rather, on believing that one’s life is going well on the whole because it is lived in
accordance with the standard that Aristotle sets in EN.
However, there is a sense in which the eudaimon is happy, so it will be useful to
draw a distinction between senses of ‘happiness’:
i) Happiness1 (H1): Nothing over and above a type of feeling: “some people feel happy
when helping old ladies across streets; others feel happy when torturing puppies:
happiness comes down to whatever you happen to like.”222
ii) Happiness2 (H2): What it means for one’s life to go well on the whole. “A theory of
“happiness” in this “well-being” sense is a theory of value; a theory of what
ultimately benefits a person.223 This sort of happiness involves living up to one’s
own standard, and living up to one’s own standard is necessary and sufficient for
happiness in this sense. Kraut notes the subjectivism in modern conceptions of
happiness.224 One is happy in the case where he meets “the standards he
imposes” on his life.225
iii) Aristotelian Happiness (AH): Happy through satisfying the conditions for eudaimonia.
There are times in a eudaimon life where he may indeed feel H1 however the eudaimon will
necessarily be H2 because he lives up to a standard that he recognizes as valuable, and sees
no significant goods as lacking in his life. More specifically, the eudaimon leads the life that
is in accordance with the standard of Aristotle’s eudaimonia. Kraut usefully describes the
eudaimon as someone who is fully satisfied with his life. So the eudaimon is happy in a
specific sense of H2 because he believes that his life is going well on the whole: he is
meeting the standard for happiness, but that standard is set by Aristotle’s eudaimonia. AH
is thus a special case of H2. III.II will argue that H2 and AH are more similar than Kraut
believes.
Section III.III will turn to the question of why this objective conception of happiness
(AH), namely eudaimonia, is the good for human beings. From Chapters 1 and 2 we can see
222 Annas, 2004. P. 2. This conception is termed as ‘extreme subjectivism’ in Kraut, 1979. P. 178.
223 Haybron, 2008. P. 5.
224 Kraut refers to this conception of happiness as ‘subjectivist’, for the standard which is used in judging your
happiness is up to you. Kraut, 1979.
225 One might wonder at this point if it is possible to have too low a standard for H2. Kraut does not address
this question, but considering that he does not believe it strange to call villains happy, I understand him to be
claiming that the evaluation of the standard is entirely up to the agent in question, and that there is no such
thing as ‘too low a standard’ for being H2.
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that Aristotle was looking for the ideal human life, and this ideal human life was not one “in
accordance with H1”; the eudaimon life is lived in accordance with what eudaimonia consists
in. The scope of III.III is not to argue that eudaimonia is the unique response to the question
of what the ideal human life is, but rather to argue that the possession and exercise of the
virtues is an essential part of H2. That is, no one would understand an agent X as H2 in the
case where X displayed “a profound lack of humanity” even if fully satisfied with his life.226
Section III.III.I will begin with a discussion of precisely why Aristotle thinks that children
cannot be AH--and therefore not H2--except in reference to their future prospects. I will
argue that children are not H2 on Aristotle’s view or on our view: children are neither
eudaimon nor leading happy lives, though we do recognize their experiencing instances of
H1 and with respect to H1 we can understand the happiness of children. III.III.II will turn to
the question of whether or not one could be H2 without the virtues. The problem with
drawing a relationship between eudaimonia and happiness is the thought that “happiness
may be successfully pursued through evil action.”227 I shall argue that H1 is the maximum
attainable happiness that villains can attain, and furthermore that H2 and AH are not as
dissimilar as Kraut believes.
III.II Eudaimonia as a conception of happiness
The characterization of the eudaimon as a happy person is now turned to, prior to
the consideration of Kraut’s objections. Kraut characterizes the happiness of a eudaimon
from the following:
“…being alive is itself good and pleasant (and it seems to be, also from the fact that
everyone desires it, and decent and blessed people most of all, since for them life is
most desirable, and their vital activity is most blessed)…”228
The eudaimon’s desire for his continued existence is derived from his perception that his life
is going well: he is very glad to be alive. Here, as Kraut notes, Aristotle must be referring to
the psychological condition of the eudaimon, who believes that his life is well worth
living.229 Aristotle also argues that the person who lives a life in accordance with excellence
226 Foot, 2001. P. 91.
227 Foot, 2001. P. 82.
228 EN 1170a26-29.
229 The eudaimon believes correctly, according to Aristotle, that his life is well worth living.
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as a whole will be eudaimon, and this person is pained at the thought of death because his
death would be a deprivation of “goods of the greatest kind.”230 Put simply, Kraut argues
that the happy life for human beings is understood through H2 where leading a life that
meets one’s own standards entails that one’s life is going well and that one is happy. For
Aristotle, the happy life is AH: meeting one’s own standards does not entail that one’s life is
going well, as this requires meeting the standard of eudaimonia. Of course, when we refer
to the happiness of the eudaimon we must be thinking of a type of H2, namely AH, for
nowhere does Aristotle refer to eudaimonia as being conducive to H1.
231 He instead refers
to the eudaimon life as “living well and doing well”,232 and neither of the two necessarily
entails smiley-faced moments. They rather refer to someone who is doing well in his life on
the whole. Aristotle, however, does refer to the ‘delight’ of the eudaimon:
The person who does not delight in fine actions does not even qualify as a person of
excellence: no one would call a person just if he failed to delight in acting justly, nor
open-handed if he failed to delight in open-handed actions; and similarly in other
cases.233
Is Aristotle hinting at occurrences of H1 whilst the eudaimon engages in virtuous activity?
Taken alone, this passage might imply that it makes the eudaimon H1 whilst being open-
handed. When Aristotle discusses open-handedness in EN IV, he says that the person who
gives money to the right people, in the right amount, and so on, will do this “with
pleasure.”234 The pleasure that the eudaimon experiences in acting virtuously is not akin to
the smiley-faced fleeting feeling one has when one is tickled.235 It is rather the pleasure of
knowing that one is acting well: living up to the eudaimon standard. Aristotle’s eudaimonia
is a conception of happiness but not one to be confused with H1. The eudaimon is H2: he has
a deep seated belief that his life is going well as a whole. He may experience instances of H1
throughout his life but this is not what his happiness consists of. I now turn to Kraut’s
objections to eudaimonia as a conception of happiness: IH and NH.
230 See Chapter Two, II.III for my interpretation of what these goods are.
231 AH is the type of H2 representing the set of people whose standard for happiness is eudaimonia.
232 EN I.4 1095a17-19.
233 EN 1099a17-19.
234 EN 1120a27. Here Aristotle also qualifies what is in accord with excellence as either pleasant or painless.
For an example of ‘painless’ excellent activity, see his treatment of courage at EN III.9.
235 Presuming, of course, that one is ticklish.
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III.II.I Is eudaimonia an inhumane conception of happiness?
Kraut characterizes eudaimonia as an inhumane conception of happiness because of
the way he views the objectivist236—someone who adheres to an objective conception of
happiness such as Aristotle’s eudaimonia. Kraut suggests that since the objectivist believes
that eudaimonia is the correct standard to be met in order to be happy, that in some
situations he will see a big difference between the ways in which people lead their lives and
the best lives for those people. Kraut characterizes the objectivist as perhaps wanting “to
shock them (those who lead lives which are far from Aristotle’s ideal life) into the realization
that they are doing a terrible job with their lives. In this way, perhaps they will change for
the better, and at any rate others will not be tempted to imitate them.”237 The point is that
the objectivist will think that his conception of happiness is the correct one and people
would do better to adhere to his standard for evaluating and understanding happiness.
What the objectivist will be trying to counter with his conception of happiness (AH) is (H2),
where as Kraut notes, the subjectivist nature of (H2) leaves it up to you to find out what life
you should lead in order to be happy, and “from a practical standpoint, [is] the less
informative theory.”238 Parents have strong beliefs about what is good for their children:
education, eating well, avoiding drugs, being free from bullying at school, and so on. But
friends may also advise each other on what to do in given circumstances, and the point I am
trying to make here is that it is not strange to recognize the trend of evaluating whether or
not your life is going well, and having people who care about you advise you on what might
be good for you even outside the parent-child relation.
Kraut recognizes that such re-evaluations of lives do take place, and that those who
are convinced that they should change the way they live their lives “may thank the
objectivist for making them see that they have unknowingly been leading unhappy lives.”239
So it is not the notion that an objectivist can convince someone else that he is leading the
wrong sort of life if he wants to be happy, and that he should change his life (even radically)
236 From here onward, an ‘objectivist’ refers to someone who adheres to Aristotle’s eudaimonia as a
conception of happiness.
237 Kraut, 1979. P. 183.
238 Kraut, 1979. P. 192.
239 Kraut, 1979. P. 184.
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if he wants to be happy, that Kraut’s objection rests on. It is rather what Aristotle’s
eudaimonia requires on Kraut’s view that he thinks makes it too stringent a conception of
happiness. Kraut’s interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia puts good theōria at the top of a
hierarchy of goods: it is the only activity chosen only for its own sake and not for the sake of
anything else, and a life in accordance with this activity, the life of the philosopher, is the
ideal life which Aristotle advocates in the EN. It should also be noted here that Aristotle
recognizes this practice of giving and receiving advice in the EN, and according to Aristotle
there is an aspect of the soul which participates in reasoning by listening to, and obeying
reason: “it is the way one is reasonable when one takes account of advice from one’s father
or loved ones…”240 The practice of giving advice to loved ones on how to lead a good life
occurred in Aristotle’s time as well. So in this respect, there is nothing about the objectivist
that is necessarily inhumane: he is simply trying to help those who are leading lives far away
from his conception of the ideal life to recognize what the ideal life is, and to inspire and
motivate those people, where change is possible, to adopt a life which is more similar to
Aristotle’s ideal. Yet Kraut’s objection still must be addressed: what about those people who
have unalterable circumstances in their lives which preclude them from, at least on Kraut’s
view, AH?
When Kraut uses an example of someone who is handicapped and argues that one
who is handicapped cannot be eudaimon, he is making two points. The first is that, even in
the case where the handicapped individual is making the best of his circumstances, he
cannot be eudaimon. This point has at its core Kraut’s characterization of eudaimonia as an
unalterable ideal which does not take personal circumstances or situations, such as physical
handicaps, into consideration. The second point which Kraut is making in his usage of the
term ‘inhumane’ is that it is perverse, if change is impossible, that an objectivist’s conception
of happiness will be used to “persuade him (the handicapped individual) to be unhappy with
his life, distant though it may be from the ideal he might have achieved.”241 Kraut’s usage of
‘unhappy with his life’ seems to imply that the handicapped person, from the objectivist’s
viewpoint, ought to be miserable. Since the handicapped person is leading a life which is so
far from the eudaimon ideal as Kraut characterizes it, he would find it difficult to be happy to
240 EN I.13 1102b31-34.
241 Kraut, 1979. P. 194.
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be alive. Kraut’s position regarding the handicapped person’s relation to eudaimonia can be
summarised with an example that he provides himself:
Now, just as the dedicated singer would find it hard to live with the public recognition
that he sings poorly, so a person who wants to see some good in his being alive will find
it hard to do so if he and others judge that his life can never be well lived.242
Kraut’s characterization of the objectivist as someone who would want to change the
viewpoint of a subjectivist who believed he was leading a happy life leads him to conclude
that if the objectivist is successful in his endeavour, then the subjectivist will cease to believe
that he is leading a happy life. And if the objectivist does this to a handicapped person, by
pointing out just how distant the handicapped person’s life is from the eudaimon ideal, then
the objectivist appears to be doing something inhumane: he is telling someone who is
incapable of changing his life for the better because of a permanent handicap that his life is
not going as well as it could otherwise have gone, and therefore that the handicapped
person should be unhappy with his life. It should be noted here that Aristotle is not
committed to the assumption that Kraut makes in his characterisation of the objectivist:
there is nothing in the EN which suggests that a eudaimon would engage in a conversation of
the sort Kraut describes. Imagine a political eudaimon who hears that one of the citizens in
his country was involved in a car crash which leaves him paralyzed and his wife and children
dead. The eudaimon rightly judges that the life of the citizen is maimed: his happiness is
impaired, because it is no longer ideal. However, there is nothing which commits the
eudaimon to visit this citizen and effectively rub it in his face that he is unable to achieve the
ideal anymore. Kraut seems to think that the objectivist is committed to this course of
action, and I find it unlikely that Aristotle is committed to this sort of activity on the part of a
eudaimon.
Note that Kraut uses the phrase ‘unhappy’, and not unsatisfied, to describe how the
handicapped person would feel about his own life.243 However to call someone ‘unhappy’ is
242 Kraut, 1979. P. 194.
243 Kraut, 1979. P. 175. Here Kraut refers to those who are “quite distant from eudaimonia” as “deeply
dissatisfied with themselves” just in case that the individuals in question adopt eudaimonia as their conception
of happiness. Kraut uses “happy” to describe someone who is “fully satisfied with his life” (p. 172). He uses
“deeply dissatisfied with themselves” to represent those who are unhappy (p. 175). I use ‘unsatisfied’ to
represent someone who recognizes that his life could be going better than it is, but is not deeply unsatisfied
with his current circumstances. I may be unsatisfied with my life today, but recognize optimistically that things
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to describe someone as sad, miserable, or even depressed. It is not clear why an objectivist
need make the claim that one who does not meet the eudaimon standard is necessarily
unhappy with his life, whatever that life may be. Aristotle does not appear to think that
there is only either ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’. When he discusses what can happen to a good
person’s life if tragic events occur he does not refer to someone who meets an end such as
Priam of Troy as ‘unhappy’. Aristotle refers to such a person as neither miserable (unhappy)
nor eudaimon (happy). This is because Aristotle thinks that “one’s activities are what
determine the quality of one’s life.”244 According to Aristotle, it is how you lead your life that
determines whether or not you are going to be happy. There is a constant emphasis on the
active life (intellectual and physical) in Aristotle’s EN and the activities one chooses to
engage in, and how those activities are pursued with respect to excellence are how we can
understand one’s happiness (AH). If someone who meets a tragic end such as Priam was not
considered wretched by Aristotle, then it does not seem clear that every non-eudaimon
individual is thus accurately characterized as wretched. So who are the people that Aristotle
thinks are unhappy with their lives? Aristotle thinks that ‘unhappiness’, or being miserable
with one’s life, is reserved for those who do terrible things:
Those who have done many terrible things and are hated because of their depravity
even take flight from life and do away with themselves. And the depraved seek others
with whom to spend their days, but are in flight from themselves; for when on their own
they are reminded of many odious things in the past and look forward to more of the
same in the future, but in company with others they can forget. And since they have no
lovable qualities there is nothing friendly about their attitude to themselves.245
Not only are evil people despised by others for what they do, but they are in conflict with
themselves because of the evil things they have done in the past and can expect to do in the
future. They are filled with regret for living evil lives, and these people wish that they would
not experience pleasure by doing such evil deeds.246 The point of quoting this lengthy
passage is to show that Aristotle certainly does not say that everyone who does not achieve
the eudaimon standard is unhappy. Unhappiness or being miserable is saved for those
may change for the better by next week. This is neither “unhappy” (miserable) nor “happy”. Perhaps this is
commonly referred to as being “okay” with one’s current circumstances in life, but this inquiry is outside the
scope of the current discussion.
244 EN I.10 1100b33-35.
245 EN IX.4 1166b12-19.
246 EN IX.4 1166b24-25.
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wretched evil people who cannot cultivate a friendly disposition towards themselves.247 It is
only those who act in a vile way that Aristotle believes to be truly miserable. As long as
someone acts well, he can at least be a good person, even if he is not capable of achieving
eudaimonia. But what does it mean to say that although someone is not AH, he is not
miserable? Is there a difference between our modern conception of happiness (H2) and
Aristotle’s (AH) regarding those who are unsatisfied with their lives?
It is unclear if someone with a physical handicap would necessarily be prevented
from becoming eudaimon. Aristotle declares that those who are handicapped with respect
to excellence248 will be unable to achieve eudaimonia. Is a physical handicap sufficient to
deprive someone of eudaimonia? This will depend on the handicap, and I will provide an
example of such a handicap now. Consider a scientist, Albert, who has a loving family,
good friends, and enjoys his daily life: it is filled with intellectual and emotional satisfaction.
He treats his family and friends well; he even has some close friends with whom he can
engage in good discussions. He works hard when he is at work, and converses about his
research with his colleagues – all the while displaying a virtuous character. Now imagine
that Albert were to wake up one day and rapidly begin to lose control of himself physically –
his nerves degenerate from his feet upwards, and he is left with only the physical ability to
speak and move his head a bit. This would be a serious physical handicap, but one which
would not impair his mind, at least directly. Albert is eudaimon before the physical
handicap, but does he remain one after he becomes partially paralyzed? Looking at what
Aristotle considered to be stains on eudaimonia, it is interesting to note that Aristotle does
not there list ‘health’.249 Albert would not be able to answer the call of duty if it ever arose:
he would not be able to act courageously on the battlefield. Is that sufficient to characterize
him as having lost eudaimonia? Aristotle stresses the active life in his claims about
eudaimonia, and he also argues that no one would call someone who lived an inactive life
247 EN IX.4 1166b26-27.
248 EN I.9 1099b20.
249 Referring to EN I.8 1099b2-8.
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happy except to win a debate.250 Does an active life require such a realization of physical
and intellectual capacities that Albert could conceivably not be eudaimon?251
The response from Aristotle to this example is clear: Albert may lose eudaimonia in
the tragic moment where he is diagnosed with this debilitating disease, yet eudaimonia
could be regained. With support from his family and friends he may learn to deal with his
disease, and continue with his research. He may engage in even more contemplation than
he did before his illness and still maintain his friendships and his relationships with his
partner and children.252 Albert may not lose eudaimonia at all: as I characterized his life it is
not clear that he placed a large amount of value on his physical mobility. The “good and
sensible person bears what fortune brings him with good grace”253 according to Aristotle. It
is this quality of the good person on Aristotle’s view which would either prevent Albert, if he
is a good person, from losing eudaimonia at all, or else grant him the ability to achieve
eudaimonia later, after a “complete passage of life in which he achieves great and fine
things.”254 A eudaimon, someone who has a deep satisfaction that he is leading a good life
on the whole, will not easily be dislodged from this position according to Aristotle. Even
when tragedy befalls him, such as in the case of Albert, if he loses eudaimonia it is
something which he will be able to achieve once more if enough time passes such that
Albert can recover and live well: thinking he is living well once more.
What about Albert’s happiness? From the moment of his first symptoms until the
last progression of his illness resulting in his near paralysis, we can imagine that he is not
very happy at all. But this is compatible with what Aristotle says about the way in which the
eudaimon values his life: it is these sorts of people who will be most pained at the thought of
death, because on their view they would be giving up some of the greatest goods available
250 EN I.5 1096a2-3.
251 Referring to EN I.5 1095b32—1096a3.
252 Though presumably these relationships will change, the change may speak of the character of Albert’s
friends and loved ones more than it does about him. One such change would be the lack of purely recreational
sex with his wife, and if this were sufficient to cause her to commit adultery this may speak more of her
appetites than of Albert’s deficiency.
253 EN I.10 1101a1-2.
254 EN I.10 1101a12-13.
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to human beings.255 The example of Albert is meant to show that tragic events affect both
‘happiness’ and ‘eudaimonia’ in a similar fashion, and that eudaimonia is not as dissimilar
from conceptions of happiness today.
Perhaps the example provided does not properly capture what Richard Kraut meant
by ‘permanently handicapped’. Imagine instead that in addition to this physical incapacity
Albert also suffered some brain damage which left him mentally disabled. He could no
longer understand his research, or even recognize the people around him. In essence, he
will have lost his ties with everything he cared for most, but he will be unaware of this loss,
such is his brain damage. When we think of Albert in a wheelchair being wheeled around by
a caregiver, a hollow shell of his former self, are we to think of him as happy? Perhaps
Albert will have the most basic cognitive capacity – like a young child, he will smile if smiled
at, and twitch in what might pass for ‘enjoyment’. This combination of mental and physical
handicap would be something that would deprive Albert of his eudaimonia. He would not
be a properly functioning human being: he would not even be properly aware of the world
around him, let alone be able to engage in excellent activity of any sort. As a conception of
happiness, is eudaimonia thus inhumane? If eudaimonia were to be the conception of
happiness we adopted, Albert would not be considered happy. However, does this judgment
conflict with the current ascriptions of happiness? Would we today consider people like
Albert happy, and thus reject Aristotle’s eudaimonia as a conception of happiness? This
evaluation is highly unlikely and regarding people in situations like Albert’s we only need to
read the debates over euthanasia: it is tough to recognize the value of such an existence, let
alone describe people like Albert as happy.
I would like to suggest at this point that there is something nonsensical in describing
Albert, someone with permanent mental and physical disabilities, as ‘happy’. Albert’s life
may have been happy up to the point where his disability arose, however to describe him as
a happy person while he is in such a broken down state does not speak of an analysis of
Albert’s current prospects. The urge to refer to those with severely crippled mental and
physical faculties as ‘happy’ seems to analyse Albert’s life prior to his current state. If a
parent hears that her child who has shown such potential in her life thus far has been hit by
255 EN III.9 1117b10-14.
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a car on the way to school at the age of 12 and rendered mentally and physically crippled for
the rest of her life it seems impossible that the parent would not be stricken with grief at the
loss for her daughter of a future that could have been so much better. All of her daughter’s
life until that point indicated a promising future, and her child’s future was snatched away in
this accident. Tragic circumstances like these can snatch (AH) and any plausible H2 away, for
this sort of example removes almost every possibility for leading a life in accordance with
any H2. Though the extension of ‘happiness’ today may immediately seem to be greater
than that of ‘eudaimonia’, it is not clear upon further inquiry that this is obvious.
I have tried to show with the examples in this section that the salient factor in
understanding either happiness or eudaimonia is the functioning of the mind. Kraut’s
thought that a permanent handicap could deprive someone of eudaimonia thus seems to fall
short. My point is that those people who are eudaimon (AH) are plausibly characterized as
possessing H2. Of course, this example has not engaged the set of people who Kraut thinks
that we would consider as happy yet are not eudaimon. I now turn to Kraut’s NH objection,
which argues that eudaimonia should be rejected as a conception of happiness because it is
too narrow: there are people who do lead happy lives who would not meet the eudaimon
standard, at least according to Kraut. I will argue that these people might be happy in an H1
way, but not in an H2 way.
III.II.II Is eudaimonia a narrow conception of happiness?
When arguing for the rejection of eudaimonia as a conception of happiness Kraut
characterizes eudaimonia as requiring “the excellent use of reason.”256 Kraut sees two
problems with eudaimonia as a conception of happiness with respect to it being narrow.
The first is that Kraut thinks someone might not use his reasoning abilities very well, but still
use his other abilities and talents such that he would lead an ideal life for him. The second
problem Kraut has is with respect to what the excellent use of reason consists in:
Here Aristotle has a lot to say. Using reason in an excellent way about practical matters
requires exercising the virtues as he interprets them: one must be temperate in matters
of physical pleasure, rather than a sensualist or an ascetic; one must be courageous,
chiefly on the battlefield, and so on…There is no reason to believe that a person fully
256 “The idea that the best life is philosophical seems much too narrow, so let us leave this aside and consider
Aristotle’s claim that the best life must make an excellent use of reason.” Kraut, 1979, p. 191.
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realizes his capacities only if he adopts Aristotle’s attitudes towards physical pleasure
and the use of force.257
This problem can be understood as either a strong or a weak claim. The weak claim is that
the virtues have some role in a conception of happiness, but that Aristotle’s list of the
virtues should not be the only one which, if satisfied, qualifies someone as happy.258 The
strong claim would be that the virtues simply have no place in a conception of happiness:
Why should my life be understood to be going well (H2) primarily because I am acting
virtuously? Why can ‘leading a happy life’ not consist in spending my life as an excellent
assassin? When Kraut refers to someone who does not act in accordance with the
excellences (either intellectual or practical), but uses his talents to lead an ideal life for him,
two potential avenues for happiness arise. The first would be happiness in the non-moral
sense through exercising non-moral qualities. I will characterize a potentially happy non-
virtuous person in the example of Gilbert, a professional athlete. The second would be the
life of the assassin named Frank: someone whose happiness depends directly on his ability
to kill mercilessly for profit. The remainder of this chapter addresses the strong claim, and
argues that AH is not narrow as Kraut believes, because understanding happy lives even
today is done centrally through evaluating the ‘happy person’ as a ‘good’ person, where
good represents ‘virtuous’ above a certain threshold.259
Consider an athlete, Gilbert, who spends his college years getting by with minimal
effort and is recruited by a low-tier basketball team in a professional league once he is
finished. Unbeknownst to him, had he trained harder in his studies or in his basketball
training, his life would have been substantially different: he would have enjoyed the
challenges in his studies and pursued a life of research upon completing college, or in the
case of his basketball training, he would have made it to a better team in the professional
league: this better team would actually have a chance of beating some of the better teams
in the league if Gilbert trained enough and created a good working synergy with his
257 Kraut, 1979. P. 191.
258 I do not address the weak claim here. To defend Aristotle’s list of virtues would require far more than the
space available here.
259 One need not be perfectly virtuous in order to be understood as leading a happy life, but being virtuous to a
degree is what I will try to show is a necessary prerequisite for happiness. This is why children, villains or
minimally virtuous people are not understood to be H2, even today.
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teammates. Instead, however, Gilbert chose a life of self-indulgence. He regularly skips
practices to go have some beers at the pub, he does not push himself at the gym to keep his
muscles and joints in good working order and his nutrition and sleep regimen deprive him of
energy he would otherwise have had, preventing him from being a better athlete. Gilbert is
not ‘using his intelligence well’ and he does not care to: he is simply apathetic with respect
to his future career. Yet, when Gilbert meets with his friends he talks about how happy he is
to be a basketball player, playing in the big leagues. Even though he loses many games and
is not really trying very hard, he has made it. He sees himself as a success and does not wish
for anything more. He is leading his ideal life, using his natural talent for athletics.
Contrast the way Gilbert lives his life with what Aristotle has to say about how to
deal with one’s lot in life:
For we consider that the truly good and sensible person bears what fortune brings him
with good grace, and acts on each occasion in the finest way possible given the resources
at the time, just as we think that a good general uses the army he has to the best
strategic advantage, and a shoemaker makes a shoe as finely as it can be made out of
the hides he has been given; and similarly with all the other sorts of craftsmen.260
This quote occurs in a passage where Aristotle is describing what might happen to a
eudaimon if tragic events occur. Aristotle defends the position that it is one’s activities
which determine the quality of that person’s life, and the relevance of the above quote is to
show that Aristotle thinks that good humans, whether generals or shoemakers, do the best
that they can with the resources available to them at the time. Gilbert is an example of
someone who is not adhering to Aristotle’s standard. He gets by because of his natural
athletic talent, but he is a fraction of what he could be if he applied himself in his role as an
athlete. Gilbert is not evil, but he is not acting virtuously either. Gilbert represents that non-
virtuous yet successful person who Kraut thinks, on my understanding, could be understood
as happy.
The standard that Gilbert sets for himself is one he has met: his playing in a big
league gives him a deep sense of satisfaction. Even though he is not as good as he could be
if he trained harder, he does not care. The threshold by which he understands his life to be
going well has been reached. I see Gilbert to be what Richard Kraut meant by someone who
260 EN I.10 1101a1-6.
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does not use his reasoning capacities very well but still uses his natural talents to be leading
his ideal life (what he thinks to be the ideal life). Now Kraut also thinks that an objectivist,
imagine Gilbert’s coach, would want to tell Gilbert how far away from his ideal life he
actually is. Gilbert’s coach would encourage Gilbert to eat better, sleep more, and train
harder – all three criteria being crucial to the proper development of an athlete. Of course,
Gilbert’s coach has an interest which would cause him to encourage Gilbert in this way: the
good of the team. Yet what if Gilbert’s friends do so as well, even though Gilbert’s playing
basketball does not directly benefit them in any way? Do we not expect our close friends
and family members to have a care in our development? If Gilbert’s friends thought that he
was falling well short of his potential and said nothing to him about that because it was
sufficient that Gilbert was meeting his own standard, what might we say about his friends?
The issue with its just being up to Gilbert to define his own standard for leading a
happy life is that there are problems with conceptions of happiness which are identified as
theories of desire satisfaction.261 On Kraut’s view, it is necessary and sufficient for Gilbert to
be meeting the standard that he values in order for him to be leading a happy life (H2). The
only way in which ‘happiness’ applies to someone like Gilbert, whose desires are defective,
is in a purely sovereign way where it is entirely up to Gilbert as to whether or not he is
leading a happy life. Gilbert is happy if he thinks he is, because he is happy if he is getting
what he wants, and Gilbert is the authority on whether he is getting what he wants.262 If we
accept Kraut’s version of happiness (H2) we will find ourselves in the realm of H1, where
happiness is nothing over and above the smiley-faced feelings we associate with it. Kraut’s
H2 is almost identical to H1, in that Kraut’s H2 locates the occurrences of H1 with my belief
that my standard is being met. The only difference between H1 and H2 is the discussion of
standards yet on Kraut’s view this standard is nothing over and above a purely subjective
standard that I set for myself. Kraut argues that H2, as I characterize it so similar to H1, is
precisely how happiness is understood today. It is unclear that we understand someone like
Gilbert as a happy person, for to do so would be to dissociate one’s own standard from any
evaluation aside from his own. A happy person on Kraut’s H2 is not happy in any sense aside
261 Note that this is a very limited point against Kraut. Kraut himself argues against desire-satisfaction theories
of the good, and even that “our nature as human beings consists in the exercise of our capacity for rational
choice” in his ‘Desire and the Human Good’. Kraut, 1994, p. 48.
262 Annas, 2004. P. 3.
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from the ‘happiness’ felt by someone who meets his own standard regardless of the content
of this standard. Is Kraut correct in arguing that there nothing in our modern conception of
happiness (his H2) which analyzes a person’s standard and thus causes us to be reluctant in
believing the person is leading a happy life?
Why shouldn’t it be enough that Gilbert thinks he is leading the ideal life for him? As
was mentioned above, there is a sense in which we think people who fall far short of their
potential are simply mistaken that they are doing well. This is why parents scold their
children for stealing cookies from the cookie jar. Children believe that their desire for a
cookie now is all that is required in order for it to be good that they have a cookie now. But
parents know many things that children do not regarding the form of a healthy diet and the
effect of sugar on children.263 Knowing this, parents believe that children are mistaken in
thinking that they are doing well for themselves by reaching for the cookie jar while
unsupervised. The standard of the parents must be met in order for the children to be
doing well in their parents’ eyes, and parents discipline children in this way in the hopes that
the children will learn lessons as they grow up. We have a system of scolding and advising
which we use today to try to help those people we think are mistaken in their desires. On
the notion of ‘using one’s reasoning capacities well’, now, as with Aristotle264, there is a
sense in which we encourage those near and dear to us to make the best of their situations.
The example of Gilbert is meant to show that ‘the excellent use of reason’ is more
broad in context than Kraut believes: more broad in that people do care about how their
friends develop themselves, and how their friends develop themselves is a crucial factor in
understanding how happy someone is. If someone falls far short of their potential, like
Gilbert does, there is a sense in which we would be sceptical that he is leading a happy life.
Gilbert may simply be a case of happiness as referred to in the “as long as he is happy…”
form of expression, but this is not an evaluation that Gilbert is leading a happy life. H1 is
neither sufficient for H2, nor AH. Simply believing that you have met your own standard for
happiness cannot, as Kraut thinks, be both necessary and sufficient for being happy: we do
not simply understand happiness as the meeting of one’s own standard, and thus Kraut’s
263 One hopes so, at least.
264 EN 1102b33-35.
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understanding of our modern conception of happiness is missing a crucial evaluative step.
The way Kraut characterizes the objectivist, as someone who would attempt to show
someone that her life is far distant from the ideal she could be leading, is pervasive in
modern society. We do care about someone’s own standards in assessing whether or not
he is happy, or at least this is the point I have been trying to make in a limited way so far in
the non-moral case of Gilbert.
It is plausible to understand Gilbert’s happiness as a form of H1: episodic bouts of
happy feelings which come about when he plays a decent game of basketball or has a good
night out with his friends. However, it has been argued thus far that Gilbert is neither H2
265
nor AH, in order to support the argument that AH and the modern conception of happiness,
H2, do not refer to two entirely different sets of people: there is a convergence between
Aristotle’s ancient conception of happiness and our modern one. Yet one more example
must be put forward in order to challenge the way Kraut thinks that happiness is treated
today. On Kraut’s view, as mentioned earlier, it is plausible to understand the happiness of
a villain using our modern conception of happiness (H2).
266 I now turn to an example of
Frank, a merciless assassin, and argue that he is not happy in any sense over and above H1.
Imagine Frank, an assassin by choice, who chooses to kill for money. He is very good
at what he does, and is never caught, for he can snipe targets from great distances and
disappear after the killings without a trace. Frank is proud of his skills, and sees himself as
providing a valuable public service. After all, there are not many people like Frank: he is
special, and as he goes about his day looking through his secret correspondence requests to
kill today’s target, he is in a happy frame of mind. He sips his coffee with a smile on his face,
eager to go about his day and kill to earn some money.267 In what I have argued so far, the
happy frame of mind (H1) is not sufficient for H2 or AH. On Kraut’s view, as long as someone
knows he is meeting his own standard for happiness, he can be understood as H2. However,
on Aristotle’s view, this is not enough, and obviously Frank is not meeting the eudaimon
265 At this point H2 entails more than satisfying one’s own standard. I will try to show that AH is similar to our
modern conception of happiness (H2) in what follows.
266 As mentioned previously, I use H2 to refer to our modern conception of happiness, unless qualified directly
as Kraut’s H2.
267 Here I am thinking about Philippa Foot’s ‘Z’ from Foot, 2001, p. 90.
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standard: he leads a life of killing mercilessly for money. If this were all that could be said
about Frank, then H2 would be so different from AH because H2 does not require one to be
understood as happy in large part because he is a good (virtuous) person.
What AH has that Kraut’s H2 does not is an evaluative criterion. If one meets the
eudaimon standard then this same person is also AH. However AH is Aristotle’s conception
of happiness, which is a life of excellent activity adequately equipped with external goods,
and not marred terribly by tragic events such that eudaimonia is lost. Calling someone
eudaimon is to refer specifically to Aristotle’s standard which links ‘happiness’ with ‘what is
good for a human being’. H2 in the subjective sense that Kraut understands it looks for
‘what is good for this particular person.’ However, I think that this characterization of
modern conceptions of happiness rests on a mistake which dissociates entirely notions of
‘what is good for this human being’ from ‘what is good for a human being’ in its general
form. This is not a question of lawyers being a better vocation than doctors or vice-versa,
but rather better illustrated through a case like Frank’s. To call Frank’s life H2 is to say that
this life is good for him, that this life benefits him. Since this life benefits Frank, people
ought to congratulate him on leading this life – after all, Frank is happy. Perhaps Frank’s
goals are worthy of pursuit, and we should aid him by buying him better weaponry or
ammunition?
The example of Frank is meant to raise the question of whether or not we can
understand as happy one who “has a profound lack of humanity.”268 If Frank’s childhood
friends were to meet him at a school reunion and inquire as to what he did for a living, do
we imagine that as Frank in an emotional voice told them how proud he was of, and how
good he was at killing people, do we imagine further that his friends would smile and
recognize Frank as a happy individual and congratulate him on the life he is leading? It is
more plausible to imagine that Frank’s childhood friends would rush away to call the police
and inform them that the assassin who has been plaguing the city has been identified. Of
course, Kraut could here still respond that whatever we have to say about Frank’s life, that
he is happy. Frank has a certain attitude towards his life: “he is very glad to be alive; he
judges that on balance his deepest desires are being satisfied and that the circumstances of
268 Foot, 2001. P. 91.
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his life are turning out well.”269 I have argued that it cannot be sufficient for happiness to
simply judge that one satisfies his deepest desires, without analyzing what those desires
are. There appears to be reluctance in claiming that someone like Frank could really be
happy, and what lurks here is an association between happiness and goodness that I
unfortunately do not have the space to defend in great detail. I do hope, however, that the
examples I have provided at least suggest the link between happiness and goodness.270
I have tried to show after a lengthy introduction in this chapter that Aristotle’s
eudaimonia is neither narrow nor inhumane. It is not inhumane because those people who
are precluded from eudaimonia on Kraut’s view are also unable to properly be understood
as happy. It is not narrow either, because although the different senses of ‘happiness’ allow
it to be more extensive than ‘eudaimonia’, in the cases where ‘happiness’ refers to ‘leading
a happy life’, our modern conception of happiness has more in common with eudaimonia
than might be understood at first glance. The conclusion of course is not that sometimes
we are wrong to use the word ‘happiness’ in certain ways. Frank might very well be happy,
but that just refers to his happy state of mind: it says nothing about the goodness of his life,
nor does it congratulate him on a life well lived. As Foot concluded, “happiness is a protean
concept, appearing now in one way and now in another” and ‘happiness’ can refer to
emotional states or a happy life, or a relationship between the two senses. The final
chapter of this dissertation will shift the discussion from happiness to well-being, and
attempt to defend Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia from the criticism by Haybron that one
may choose “the path of greater excellence and virtue, a life that more fully exercised her
capacities as a human being. But she was not securing or promoting her happiness or well-
being. She was sacrificing it.”271
269 Kraut, 1979. P. 170.
270 Foot, 2001 Ch. 6 contains an in depth discussion of the link between goodness and happiness.
271 Haybron, 2008. P. 163.
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Chapter IV: Aristotle’s Perfectionism
IV.I Introduction
In Chapter Three I defended Aristotle’s eudaimonia as happiness and argued that
‘happiness’ as a word in the English language has different senses, one of which is similar to
Aristotle’s eudaimonia. We must remember that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is an answer to the
question of what it means for one’s life to go well on the whole: Aristotle’s EN is a search
for, and an explanation of, the chief good for human beings. With this in mind, Aristotle’s
account of eudaimonia is better characterized as a theory of well-being which, I argue, must
answer the question “can eudaimonia provide plausible answers of what I should do to lead
a life which is good for me?” This fourth and final chapter will focus on the example of
Angela, introduced by Daniel Haybron272 to argue that Aristotle’s eudaimonia, being
centrally understood as a life of virtuous activity, requires the sacrifice of one’s well-being in
situations where it could otherwise be secured or promoted. Aristotle’s eudaimonia offers
an outline of what the virtuous person does that runs contrary to Haybron’s understanding
of one’s well-being, and so Haybron argues that Aristotle’s eudaimonia should be rejected
as a plausible theory of well-being.273
Aristotle’s theory of eudaimonia has been characterized as a type of perfectionism,
where perfectionism “directs us to develop our human nature.”274 Understanding
eudaimonia as a type of perfectionism recalls Aristotle’s FA, where a good human being is
one who exercises his characteristic function well: by now familiar to us as the active life in
accordance with the excellences. Haybron criticizes eudaimonia as a theory of well-being
because on his view Aristotle’s eudaimonia has “perfection as the…primary constituent of
human flourishing.”275 The problem with Aristotle’s eudaimonia according to Haybron is
that acting in accordance with the excellences involves the sacrifice of other goods which
272 Haybron, 2008. P.161-3.
273 I realize that phrases such as ‘good-for’, ‘well-being’ and so on refer to a vast literature of philosophical
argumentation which aid in their definition. In this chapter I will use ‘X’s well-being’ and ‘good-for X’ such that
the former defines the latter: a theory of well-being such as Aristotle’s eudaimonia consists of a definition of
what is good for a person. I must leave aside, due to space constraints, the question of whether or not the
interpretation of eudaimonia that I have argued for and defended throughout this dissertation entails that the
eudaimon I describe is an egoist. For an interesting discussion of this question see Kraut, 1989, Ch. 2.
274 Hurka, 1993. P. 55.
275 Haybron, 2008. P. 163.
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count more towards our well-being than excellent activity does. In other words, one is
potentially worse-off than she would have been otherwise if she chooses to act in
accordance with Haybron’s interpretation of eudaimonia: Haybron argues that she will be
giving up goods which contribute to our well-being but not to our eudaimonia to an extent
that makes them worthy of choice on his reading of Aristotle. In IV.II I will quote the
example of Angela at length and then proceed to argue the following points against it.
I will argue that Haybron is mistaken about what Aristotle’s eudaimonia directs
Angela to do. Haybron notes that Aristotelians “who wish to secure an intuitively plausible
verdict in Angela’s case would have to put a lot of weight on external goods—more, it
seems, than even the most extravagant interpretation of Aristotle’s views could sustain.”276
I will use the interpretation of eudaimonia outlined in Chapters One and Two to argue for an
understanding of virtuous activity as the central constituent of one’s well-being that does
not require it to be the sole contributor, as Haybron seems to think. I will argue that
Haybron’s characterization of Angela gives an insufficient weight to the human aspect of
Aristotle’s account of a eudaimon life: a eudaimon life includes distinctly human goods such
as friendship which Haybron’s characterization of eudaimonia cannot accommodate. I
understand Haybron’s interpretation of Aristotle to be one where a eudaimon will at all
times seek to do what “fully exercises [his] capacities, [and functions] more fully qua human
being.”277 Haybron’s interpretation commits a eudaimon to maximising virtuous actions
whenever possible.278
Aristotle does provide a broad ranking for the activities humans can engage in. In
Chapters One and Two, I explained Aristotle’s arguments in favour of good theōria as the
best activity we can engage in. Lives which are lived in accordance with the rest of
excellence, such as that of the politician, are still eudaimon on Aristotle’s view. If Haybron’s
interpretation is right, then Aristotle is not arguing that, ceteris paribus, more virtuous
activity is better than less. For Haybron’s VM interpretation of Aristotle to be correct,
Aristotle could not be making the claim that ceteris paribus, I should choose to engage in
virtuous activity wherever possible. On Haybron’s reading, I will always be better off on
276 Haybron, 2008. P. 163.
277 Haybron, 2008. P. 163.
278 I refer to this interpretation of Aristotle by Haybron as ‘the maximisation of virtuous actions’ (VM).
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Aristotle’s view if I choose the path which involves greater perfection; the path which
involves “a greater degree of human functioning.”279 In Angela’s case, I will argue that things
are anything but equal, and that we should understand Aristotle as making the claim that,
ceteris paribus, more virtuous activity in a life is better than less. Finally, I will characterize
Haybron’s interpretation of Aristotle’s perfectionism in a different light, where the decision-
making process of the eudaimon takes “into account both past activities and future
opportunities, as well as the centrality of each capacity to human nature.”280 Kauppinen
does not provide a defence of Aristotle’s perfectionism in his paper, but rather a defence of
perfectionism by providing different examples of what perfectionism may entail. I adapt
one of Kauppinen’s forms of perfectionism to Aristotle’s eudaimonia in order to show that
characterizing Aristotle’s eudaimon as someone who simply maximizes his ‘human capacity’,
as Haybron understands for all instances in his life, is overly simplistic.
Haybron’s example does not just demonstrate Haybron’s VM interpretation of
Aristotle: it is also a claim about what we think is good for Angela. In addition to arguing
that Haybron’s interpretation of Aristotle is not obvious, I will argue that Haybron’s intuition
about what is better for Angela is not straightforward. I will provide two modified versions
of Angela’s case in order to cast doubt on Haybron’s conclusion that Angela, if she acts as
Haybron thinks she should, fares better. As I attempted to show in Chapter Three,
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not far removed from modern notions of what is good for us. The
brevity of this chapter ensures that I will be making a minimal claim on this point: that what
Aristotle’s eudaimonia asks of us, and what anyone not having read Aristotle would think
she would do were she in Angela’s position, involve a similar analysis. A eudaimon does not
only think about how to fit as much virtuous activity in a day as he can, as Haybron thinks he
does.
IV.II Haybron’s Angela
I now quote Haybron’s example of Angela at length. I will use this example to
provide an explanation of what Aristotle’s perfectionism entails on Haybron’s view and
dedicate the remainder of this chapter to the response.
279 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
280 Kauppinen, Antti. 'Working Hard and Kicking Back: The Case for Diachronic Perfectionism'. Forthcoming
in The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. P. 4.
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Consider then the case of a high-ranking career diplomat for the UK, Angela, who is
contemplating an early retirement at the age of 62: having served her country with great
distinction for many years, Angela has come into a good deal of money through some
canny investments and a bit of luck. She has all but decided to retire with her husband
to a villa in Tuscany, and could do so very comfortably on her earnings. (They have a
number of good friends in the area and it would bring her much closer to her daughter
and grandchildren, who reside in Milan.) She correctly envisages that a life there would
be tremendously satisfying, occupied largely with good company and food and drink,
walking the countryside, and catching up on her reading. In short, kicking back and just
enjoying life. It would certainly be a welcome and much-deserved respite from her
demanding career in diplomacy: while rewarding in its own way, the schedule is hectic,
and by now she has had enough of it. Before she can settle on her plans, however, a
political crisis arises overseas and she is asked to take an important post where her
considerable wisdom and skills would be of great use. It is hoped that Angela’s efforts
would help to avert a bloody conflict over the next several years. There are others who
could do the job and her efforts could well fail, but no one could fill the role as well as
her. Naturally, the assignment would be taxing and heavy on travel, and frequently
involves dealing with unwholesome individuals about matters of extreme gravity, often
calling for a fair measure of anger and indignation on her part. (As Aristotle observes
about courage, virtue isn’t always pleasant on the whole.) But the experience would not
be gruelling, or even unpleasant on the whole, as she does take pleasure in doing what
she does best. Moreover, it would not be so taxing that she cannot spend some time
with family and friends, and otherwise achieve a modicum of leisure. Yet it would be far
less pleasant than the alternative.
…
“She goes on to serve admirably and with a good deal of success in sustaining the peace,
but another six years pass before she can take her retirement, which lasts five relatively
sedentary but agreeable years before a massive stroke suddenly takes her life. (A time
and manner of death that would have been the same had she not taken the job.)
…
In taking the job, Angela chose the path of greater excellence and virtue a life that more
fully exercised her capacities as a human being. But she was not securing or promoting
her happiness or well-being. She was sacrificing it. This is a problem for Aristotelian
accounts of well-being, and any other views that see perfection as the sole or primary
constituent of human flourishing.281
Angela’s life is an example of eudaimonia, for she enjoys and excels at a job which can
roughly be characterized as that of Aristotle’s political eudaimon.282 She is faced with a
major decision which will affect the rest of her life. Since her continued existence as a
politician involves what Haybron believes to be Aristotelian perfectionism, that is that
Angela develops herself as a human being to a greater extent just in case where she acts
more virtuously, Angela is committed to spending her remaining years largely occupied with
281 Haybron, 2008. P. 161-3.
282 A life which involves more than virtuous activity, as I argued in Chapter Two.
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her career. In choosing to continue her career, Angela becomes unable to enjoy the goods
that Haybron associates with the move to Tuscany—which he identifies as making her better
off than continuing in her job as a diplomat.283 Haybron’s argument can be understood in
the following way:
1. Aristotle’s perfectionism says that the best option for any agent at any time is going
to be the one which best uses the agent’s capacities.
2. Angela’s career as a diplomat uses her human capacities more than her retirement
would284 and “involves greater perfection: it is obviously more virtuous…”285
3. Aristotle’s perfectionism thus commits Angela to think that continuing her career is
better for her than retiring (1 & 2).
4. But according to Haybron, (3) is “deeply implausible.”286 Haybron argues that Angela
would be better off retiring and relaxing after having worked so hard during her
diplomatic career. Though continuing in her job is (2) on Haybron’s view, Angela
would be sacrificing her well-being in taking the job. Angela should retire and lead a
relaxed life after having worked hard during her life as a diplomat.
5. Aristotle’s perfectionism is not aligned with our intuitions about what is good for
Angela, and thus Aristotle’s perfectionism as a theory of well-being is false (3 & 4).
IV.III Angela as a Eudaimon
Haybron notes after introducing the example of Angela that though continuing her
job, Angela is not “impoverished” in any of the areas in her personal life.287 I take this to
mean that Angela’s personal life as a diplomat includes goods such as friends and more
above whatever threshold one could imagine that allow a eudaimon to quit work and focus
on the home life instead. The problem according to Haybron, however, is that continuing
her job as a diplomat is far less pleasant than her life kicking back in Tuscany. The question
remains as to whether or not Aristotle’s perfectionism truly commits Angela to continue her
283 These goods are a comfortable life lived with good friends, becoming closer to her daughter and
grandchildren, good company in general, good food and drink, walks in the countryside, and catching up on
her reading. I avoid the characterization of ‘reading’ as being related to good theōria in order to
straightforwardly adapt Angela’s retirement life to one of philosophical activity. Haybron thinks that Angela
should retire because her retirement will be far more pleasant than continuing her job. If Angela thought that
retiring would be good even partly because it would allow her to pursue philosophy, she would not be retiring
for the same reasons that Haybron argues are the reasons why she should retire.
284 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
285 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
286 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
287 Haybron, 2008. P. 163.
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job as a diplomat, and if so whether or not this is so for the reasons that Haybron believes,
having characterized Aristotle’s eudaimonia as a perfectionist theory of well-being.
Premises 2 and 4 of Haybron’s argument are what strike me as unclear. In Premise
2, Haybron claims that Angela’s career is more virtuous and more fully uses her human
capacities than her retirement. It is true that Aristotle believes that good theōria is a better
activity than acting courageously on the battlefield.288 Yet there is a difference between
claiming that, ceteris paribus, a philosopher aims to engage in as much good reflective
activity as he can and claiming that in every circumstance a philosopher will always choose
good reflective activity over other virtuous activities, say by ignoring the urgent call of a
good friend who is desperate for his help in order to continue philosophising. In order for
Haybron’s conclusion about what Angela would choose to do as a eudaimon to be correct,
he must be attributing to Aristotle the position that a eudaimon should always choose
activities in accordance with the best excellence whenever the opportunity arises. The
remainder of this section consists of my response to Premise 2.
Regarding Premise 4, Haybron’s intuition that Angela is clearly better off if she
retires is not clear. Haybron grants that Angela “fares well in either scenario” however he
argues that she is clearly better off if she retires. Is it obvious that Angela is better off if she
retires?289 Perhaps before the political crisis came about, Angela’s well-being would be
located in finally retiring after a long career. After the crisis comes about, perhaps it is
permissible for her to retire given that Haybron characterizes her job as involving “important
requests [which] come along all the time.”290 Yet Haybron argues that Angela should retire,
and that on his VM interpretation of Aristotle Angela would continue her diplomat job. In
IV.IV I turn to Premise 4 and what Haybron argues Angela should do, both in terms of her
well-being and her eudaimonia.
288 Chapter Two of this dissertation.
289 Please see http://ethics-etc.com/2009/02/08/sweating-hard-and-hanging-out-the-case-for-diachronic-
perfectionism/ for an interesting discussion both of Kauppinen’s response to Haybron’s example of Angela,
and the example itself.
290 Haybron, 2008. P. 162
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Regarding Premise Two, it was argued in Chapter Two that there is nothing in
Aristotle calling for VM.291 Though Aristotle himself does not entertain such cases as
Angela’s in the EN, it remains deeply implausible to attribute VM to his account of
eudaimonia. Though eudaimonia is understood centrally through virtuous activity, it is not
only virtuous activity which is needed for a life to be eudaimon. Yet Aristotle’s
perfectionism is apparently what directs Angela to choose as she does, according to
Haybron, because “the Aristotelian must presumably say she is better off having taken the
job. For by any reasonable measure, the diplomatic assignment involves greater perfection:
it is obviously more virtuous, more admirable, and remains so over time.”292 I agree that,
ceteris paribus, Angela as a eudaimon would choose to continue as a diplomat. Yet it does
not follow from Aristotle’s EN that strict principles can directly be drawn from the outline
provided. If this were to be true, then consider the following example:
i) Good theōria is the best activity I can engage in.
ii) My child was hit by a car on the way home from school and though not hurt too badly, is
frightened by the experience.
iii) I could stop my daily philosophy a bit early today and go to him in the hospital to comfort
him, but
iv) Since VM directs me to always choose the path of action which is the most virtuous per se,
because the most virtuous path is the one on which I function most fully qua human
being,
v) I should continue philosophizing because on Aristotle’s view it is a better activity for me to
engage in than going to help my son (From iv) and i)).
vi) I continue my philosophy over going to comfort my son, as VM requires me to choose the
path with “a greater degree of human functioning”, and the most virtuous activity I can
engage in is good theōria.
I suggest that this characterization of Aristotle’s eudaimonia is absurd. A more plausible
reading of Aristotle would understand him to be making the claim that, ceteris paribus,
more virtuous activity is better than less. Good theōria is the best activity that human
beings can engage in when compared with any of the other activities that humans may
potentially engage in. However, it does not follow from this claim that good theōria is what
291 Though in Chapter Two, my argument focused centrally on the thought that eudaimones could be
philosophers, politicians, or private citizens against the for-the-sake-of relation ending in good theōria as Kraut
thinks.
292 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
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the philosopher eudaimon will choose over any other virtuous activity in an example where
things are anything but equal such as in Angela’s case. Haybron’s example is meant to show
that it is better for Angela’s life on the whole if she chooses to retire instead of continuing in
her job as a diplomat. Since Aristotle’s claim is that, ceteris paribus, more of good theōria is
better than less,293 the analysis of what Angela does as a eudaimon must be done with
respect to the goods in a eudaimon life, which number more than good theōria.
Aristotle does not mention cases like the one of the philosopher choosing between
continuing his philosophy and aiding his son. Haybron likely chose the life of a diplomat for
Angela because it shares a strong affinity to the life of the politician in Aristotle’s work.
Aristotle notes that his inquiry in the EN “is not for the sake of theory…for we are not
inquiring into what excellence is for the sake of knowing it, but for the sake of becoming
good, since otherwise there would be no benefit in it at all.”294 Aristotle was not seeking to
provide a large set of rules which someone like Angela could think about before coming to
her conclusion. The point of the EN is to provide a practical benefit to his audience. So,
Haybron’s argument does not work if it needs VM to be Aristotle’s position in the EN, since
such a position yields clearly impractical results.
It should be noted that VM is precisely what directs Angela to understand her well-
being as being located in the path which Haybron believes is more virtuous. On Haybron’s
view, what Angela does is straightforwardly what Aristotle’s eudaimonia directs her to do
and furthermore is how she understands her well-being. Angela “accepts the
assignment…without regret.”295 Haybron’s point is that although Angela fares well in either
scenario, she fares much better retiring, and retiring is something which Angela cannot do
because of his characterization of Aristotle: VM.
Perhaps there is something about Angela‘s case aside from VM which would cause
her to refrain from retiring. The following are three aspects of Angela’s case which greatly
293 As relevant to this example, engaging in greater and finer virtuous activities is better than engaging in lesser
forms.
294 EN II.2 1103b26-30.
295 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
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affect what we think she should do, each of which I shall discuss each in turn in order to
clarify why premise 4 of Haybron’s argument is dubious:
i) Her age and the time she has already spent as a diplomat.
ii) The urgency of the diplomatic situation and her ability to help resolve it.
iii) The comparison of pleasantness between continuing as a diplomat versus retiring to
Tuscany.
These are the three variables which, on my view, greatly influence what any agent would
choose if she were in Angela’s position.
IV.IV Angela’s Well-Being
Angela has spent a while at her job and dedicated “many years”296 to the service of
her country. Would Aristotle say that she should live out the remainder of her days as a
politician? Haybron notes that Angela is 62 years old and contemplating retiring early. Is
early a function of her age, or is it also a function of how many years Angela has been a
diplomat? Imagine that Angela became a diplomat at the age 40, and spent 22 years in the
service of her country before reaching her limit.297 Does it seem reasonable that spending
22 years as a diplomat would satisfy Haybron’s “many years” criterion and qualify Angela for
“early” retirement? It is not clear that at 62 her retirement is early. The point here is that
there surely exists a threshold such that beyond this threshold, Angela would be better off
retiring, and before this threshold she would be better off continuing her job as a diplomat.
Figuring out where this threshold lands does not seem to be an easy task, but let us imagine
that Angela has spent 35 years as a diplomat, having led her busy political life since the age
of 27. She has a husband and some friends, and her social situation is not impoverished as
Haybron mentions, however her relationships with her family and friends are not as good as
they could be.
Note that in retiring to Tuscany, Angela would become “much closer to her daughter
and grandchildren.”298 When Haybron mentions this point it is clear that he is referring to
geographical proximity, however the ease with which Angela would be able to visit and be
296 Haybron, 2008. P. 161.
297 “…and by now she has had enough of it.” Haybron, 2008, P. 162.
298 Haybron, 2008. P. 161.
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visited by her family members creates the potential for having stronger relationships with
them. This is why as a diplomat Angela spends only “some time with family and friends.”299
Would Aristotle believe that Angela is worse off, after having spent all those years in the
service of her country in a demanding role, has no cause for a leisurely retirement which
includes spending quality time with good friends and loved ones? Haybron does not think
an interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia could direct Angela to retire, for “putting so
much weight on non-moral excellence would be hard for conventional Aristotelians to
sustain.”300
Why Haybron believes this to be the case for Aristotle is unclear. Angela has “a
number of good friends in the area” where she could retire. Aristotle argues that the best
friendships, ethically speaking, are friendships based on excellence. So there is certainly
space for Aristotle’s eudaimon to be concerned with his friendships, especially because
when one has friendships based on the excellence of the individuals involved, with respect
to each person’s character, this ”is not a relation that one can have towards many, and one
should be content to find even a few like that.”301 Friendship is an important good for
humans in the EN, and this good is definitely a part of eudaimonia. Living in isolation is
difficult for an individual according to Aristotle, and furthermore the good person naturally
desires good friends.302 To straightaway conclude that Aristotle would direct Angela to
continue her job is to downplay the role of friendship in Aristotle’s account. It seems
plausible that Aristotle would think that Angela could valuably spend her time with her good
friends and loved ones in retirement, having spent a great deal of her life in her political
role, not be worse off for it. Spending time with good friends is important in the life of the
eudaimon: good friends are hard to find. Is Angela’s retirement after many busy years as a
politician, to spend the remaining years of her life in the company of loved ones and good
friends, less virtuous than continuing her job as a diplomat? Again, good theōria is superior
299 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
300 Haybron, 2008. P. 163.
301 EN IX.10 1171a18-20.
302 I do not have space to give a proper treatment of Aristotle’s account of friendship here. It is hardly
controversial to allow that someone who values virtuous activity would naturally form the best (at least
ethically) friendships with those who are also virtuous, and be unable to form friendships with those who are
not.
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to activity in accordance with the rest of excellence, but which is ‘more virtuous’ – the
politician’s activity or the warrior on the battlefield defending his city? Arguably, different
capacities and different virtues are used at different times in a eudaimon life, but Aristotle
does not provide a fine-grained measuring stick by which to measure the priority of virtuous
activity in a life.
Angela’s retirement life still contains virtuous activity, but what is important on
Haybron’s VM is that “there is no credible sense, non-moral or otherwise, in which Angela,
or her activities, would exhibit more excellence on the whole if she retired.”303 It is not
necessary to show that retirement is more virtuous for it to be an option open to Angela on
Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia. It rather needs to be shown that the choice between two
virtuous paths of activity, in Angela’s case retirement versus continuing in her job, is not the
simple choosing of whichever is likely to involve more virtuous activity: the eudaimon
calculation is not simply VM at all times in a life, if ever. Angela as a eudaimon could
plausibly think, before the current diplomatic crisis job is offered to her:
In my job as a diplomat I have accomplished many fine and great things over the years: I
have done my best to be a good diplomat. I am getting on in age and have not spent as
much time as I could have with my family and friends. Though I am not impoverished in
these areas whilst working, I am not as good a friend or as good a mother/wife as I could
have been because my job kept me so very busy. Since these important crises arise all
the time and I have given so much in service to my country, I can retire to treat, and be
treated well by my good friends and loved ones.
This characterization of Angela’s thoughts as a eudaimon is meant to serve as a plausible
way of understanding what a choice between two virtuous situations would involve for the
eudaimon. Aristotle’s eudaimonia does not guide Angela according to Haybron’s VM. It
rather guides Angela to act virtuously in whatever she does, whether she is a merchant, a
politician, or a philosopher.
Since friendships can be ethical in nature according to Aristotle, and since as Haybron
understands Aristotelian perfectionism Angela would choose to continue her job as a
diplomat because it is more virtuous and so forth, I quote what I believe to be a better form
of Aristotelian perfectionism than the sort Haybron has in mind as representing what the
eudaimon would do.
303 Haybron, 2008. P. 163.
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Human Nature Perfectionism (HNP): At any time t, the best option for an agent A is the
one that contributes most to the realization of a balanced pattern of exercising the
various human capacities to their fullest extent…over the course of a lifetime, taking into
account both past activities and future opportunities, as well as the centrality of each
capacity to human nature.304
On this form of perfectionism, Angela’s best option is one she will choose whilst keeping in
mind what she has done in the past, and what she will be able to do in the future. Given
that Angela has spent so much time as a diplomat, and on her view an insufficient amount of
time with her friends and loved ones (hence why retiring is seen as such a good for her by
Haybron), it is entirely plausible that as a eudaimon she would realize that she has spent
much of her life pursuing political goals, and now chooses to spend the rest of her life
enjoying her friendships to the fullest degree. Kauppinen’s ANP is more detailed than the
section that I have quoted: HNP. However I feel that this portion best charts Aristotle’s
attempt at a broad outline of what the eudaimon chooses to do. Recall that Aristotle’s
eudaimonia involves a consideration of what a ‘complete life’ consists in.305 The advantage
of HNP over Haybron’s VM is that it can accommodate Angela’s thoughts of how her life is
going as a whole: it does not commit her solely to a calculation between two virtuous
activities in isolation, as Haybron understands her choice in his example.
So far I have only dealt with one factor in Haybron’s example which might cause
Angela to retire, opposing his characterization of Aristotle’s eudaimonia as VM. Having
outlined the form of perfectionism (HNP) which I feel better characterizes Aristotle’s
eudaimonia, I now turn to ii) and iii).
The urgency of the political crisis plays a factor in understanding what is good for
Angela. I briefly characterize three ways in which this crisis can be understood:
i) There is a crisis that Angela is likely to resolve if she continues working and her
replacements, if she retires, are not likely to succeed.
ii) There is a crisis that Angela is not likely to resolve if she continues working and her
replacements, if she retires, are likely to succeed.
304 Kauppinen, P. 4. Kauppinen refers to this as Animal Nature Perfectionism, as it functions with respect to
“members of a biological species with specific patterns of development and decay, and natural rhythms.” (P.
5). I use a shortened version of ANP here (HNP).
305 I discuss this in Chapter Two.
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iii) There is a crisis that Angela is likely to resolve if she continues working and her
replacements, if she retires, are marginally less likely to succeed.
It should be noted here that it would be good for Angela in ii) to retire, for if she is not likely
to resolve the crisis with her efforts than she is wasting her time: her remaining years could
be better spent around her loved ones as there is no reason for her to remain in her
position. My i) does not seem to properly account for Haybron’s example, but it should be
clear that were Angela to believe that she would likely resolve the conflict if she continued
working and yet still leave her post, Aristotle and our ideas of what is good for Angela would
coincide almost perfectly. We could plausibly conclude that Angela could not be enjoying a
calm retirement in Tuscany after knowingly abandoning her special position, where her
“considerable wisdom and skills would be of great use.”306 She would likely feel guilty, at
least on occasion, knowing that her efforts could potentially have changed everything.
The same could be said for Angela as a eudaimon. Even if she is not blameworthy for
not knowing that her replacements would not do as good a job as she would have done in
their stead, she would feel pained at the knowledge that her country’s diplomatic situation
has worsened and she might have made the difference. I mention i) and ii) briefly in order
to show a correlation between what we think Angela should do for her well-being and what
Aristotle’s eudaimon Angela would do for her eudaimonia.
Case iii) seems to capture Haybron’s example most accurately. Her replacements
“could do the job, and her efforts could well fail, but no one could fill the role as well as
her.”307 Here Haybron may think that because Angela will recognize that she is the best
person for the job,308 that Aristotle’s perfectionism would direct her to continue in her job
because she is such an excellent diplomat.
Yet the very same reasoning that Haybron provides to explain why Angela should not
feel bad about retiring are compatible with Aristotle’s eudaimonia, for she has sacrificed
306 Haybron, 2008. P. 162, emphasis mine.
307 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
308 This must be the case. If Angela did not know that she was the best person for the job how could she
plausibly feel obliged to stay on? If there were people as good as her, she could retire unless having her as an
extra person would make the difference. But Haybron does not refer to her role as being carried out by a
group, just by her.
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much in the many years serving her country, and learned that part of her job requires one to
forcibly carve out some personal space and say no even to important requests for they come
along frequently.309 If Haybron’s interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia is correct, Angela
would never be able to retire and be considered eudaimon, for she would be sacrificing
much virtuous activity. Since VM is not a plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia,
I argue that Haybron is incorrect to argue that Angela must continue with her job on
Aristotle’s view. The preceding arguments have attempted to show that there is nothing in
Aristotle’s EN which makes it straightforwardly obvious that Angela should continue her job.
However, the question remains as to whether or not Angela should retire on Aristotle’s
view.
Haybron himself argues that Angela has “sacrificed much in service to her country”,
referring to her “demanding career” and her “hectic schedule”310 prior to her being
presented with the new diplomatic assignment. Yet, Haybron attempts to claim that
Angela’s human life with respect to personal relationships and leisure was not impoverished
in her time working as a diplomat. Maintaining this conjunction is difficult without holding
the position that Angela’s personal life was marginally above whatever ‘impoverished’
means in these circumstances. For how can Angela have “sacrificed much” whilst having
good friends, children, marriage, and a job which she excels at and finds rewarding while
earning enough money to potentially retire in reasonably health.
Obtaining all of those goods in a single life whilst having “sacrificed much” appears
impossible. The point here is that Haybron cannot construct this example in this way: for if
Angela had sacrificed much, HNP would direct Angela to retire and fully enjoy her
friendships and family. Yet Haybron wants to maintain that Angela has sacrificed much but
not so much that enjoying the love of her friends and family in retirement would be
warranted on Aristotle’s account. This position is highly dubious, for it is difficult to claim
309 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
310 Haybron, 2008. P. 162. Haybron characterizes Angela’s job as demanding in itself. Before the offer of the
new assignment he describes the job as demanding, hectic, and involving much sacrifice. If she takes the new
assignment, it will be “heavy on travel, and frequently [involve] dealing with unwholesome individuals about
matters of extreme gravity, often calling for a fair measure of anger and indignation on her part.” Haybron,
2008. P. 162.
MPhil – George Grech
Aristotle’s Eudaimonia and Two Conceptions of Happiness
86
that Angela should retire because she has sacrificed much in her life while maintaining that
during her time at this job she enjoyed all of the goods Haybron mentions.
It is difficult to draw precise thresholds in Aristotle’s account, and perhaps with good
reason: precise thresholds are impossible given the complex nature of human life. If it is
true that Angela has sacrificed a lot in her many years in this career, and that her
replacements are not great but ‘good enough’ to have a good chance of negotiating well,
Haybron and Aristotle would agree that Angela should retire. However from the list of
goods that Haybron lists Angela as having in her life as a diplomat, and from her status as
the best person from the job, she could also plausibly be characterized as needing to stay in
this job by both Haybron and Aristotle, for the pleasant nature of retiring, though good, is
not necessarily enough to outweigh the sense of accomplishment that Angela would feel at
maintaining the peace for more years.
It should be noted here that accomplishment does play a motivational role in a
eudaimon life. Consider the accomplishment of a courageous person:
But the courageous person is as unshakeable as a human being can be. So he will be
afraid of those sorts of things too, but he will withstand them in the way one should,
and following the correct prescription, for the sake of achieving what is fine; for this is
what excellence aims at.311
Excellent activities aim at achieving what is ‘fine’ or ‘noble’ according to Aristotle: “Actions
in accordance with excellence are fine and for the sake of the fine.”312 Aristotle notes that
achieving and preserving the good for a nation is “finer and more godlike”313 than achieving
it for one person. Doing something fine for Aristotle, as I characterise from these quotes, is
associated with doing what is appropriate in a given circumstance. It also can be
understood as doing something outstanding, perhaps for one’s nation in battle or the
political forum. This is one factor in Aristotle’s eudaimonia which may provide Angela with a
motivation to continue in her job: she may, being particularly well suited to this political
crisis, be the one most likely to achieve something outstanding in its nobility. Yet, against
even this, is the thought that perhaps she has been achieving these great and fine things for
311 EN III.7 1115b11-13.
312 EN IV.I 1120a23-24. Unfortunately, I cannot go into detail about what ‘for the sake of the fine’ means, and
here I am providing a characterization of how ‘the fine’ might motivate Angela.
313 EN I.2 1094b11.
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many years. Is there no point in which a political eudaimon can relax and retire from public
service? Must Angela continue as a diplomat until she is physically or mentally unable to
skilfully. Even with considerations of acting ‘for the sake of the fine’, Aristotle is providing a
further detail for understanding the value of virtuous activity. This does not necessarily
commit him to the view, as Haybron understands him, of guiding Angela towards a position
that maximises the fine quality of her activity in the political arena.
Which path is more likely to be a greater contributor to Angela’s well-being? The
response to this must depend on which Angela would value more: a relaxing retirement in
which she will potentially hear that negotiations failed, and wonder if she might have made
the difference,314 or instead in trying her best to accomplish a difficult political negotiation.
Haybron does not provide us with Angela’s preference in this regard, so there does not
appear to be a clear response as to what Angela should do for her well-being.
Haybron claims that the retired life will be more pleasant for Angela than continuing
in her job as a diplomat. On his view Angela “would clearly have been better off taking the
early retirement. It would be much more pleasant, she would be substantially happier, and
she would be pursuing the sorts of activities that most appeal to her and, at least at this
stage of her life, bring her the greatest satisfaction.”315 This seems plausible if we agree that
Angela has done enough work in her life to earn herself the break from her stressful and
demanding job and that she is not abandoning her position, for as was argued earlier, she
may plausibly be miserable in her retirement if negotiations failed and a war broke out: she
may believe that she could have made the difference. If HNP is a good characterization of
what a eudaimon would choose, and Angela is a eudaimon, then it would be up to Angela to
weigh the three factors mentioned against each other. If she concluded that she had spent
enough time working and accomplishing great and fine things, and that the immediacy of
the crisis was not such that it would outweigh the pleasantness of her retired life, then she
would retire. Yet it is up to Angela to decide what will best promote her well-being, and I
have tried to use this idea to align what we think Angela should do with what we think
Aristotle’s eudaimon would do. As I argued in Chapter Three, there is a sense in which what
314 And potentially not care, as she has contributed so much in her life towards the cause and thinks that she is
justified in retiring.
315 Haybron, 2008. P. 162.
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we think we should do in many different spheres is strikingly similar to what a eudaimon
could be characterized as choosing to do: Aristotle’s eudaimonia requires more than a
maximisation of virtuous activity and can be understood even today as a sense of happiness
and a plausible theory of well-being.
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